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1. INTRODUCTION
The current state of product liability laws in the United States has
become the subject of widespread public debate and calls for reform.'
The media have largely focused on the perceived liability insurance cri-
sis,' but many other aspects of the product liability system have added
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I See Barron, 4 Legislatures Act To Readjust Liability Rules, N.Y. Times, July
14, 1986, at Al, col. 1; Kristof, Insurance Woes Spur Many States To Amend Law on
Liability Suits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1986, at Al, col. 2 ("Nearly every state legisla-
ture that has met in 1986 considered bills to change its civil liability system . . .);
Face the Nation (CBS syndicated television broadcast, June 15, 1986). The Reagan
Administration has also entered the public debate, advocating changes in the liability
system. Boyd, Reagan To Seek Changes in Laws To Limit Awards in Liability Suits,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1986, at A23, col. 1; Reagan Addresses Rally, [Jan.-June] 14
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 380 (June 6, 1986) (" 'Twisted and
abused, tort law has become a pretext for outrageous legal outcomes-outcomes that
impede our economic life, not promote it,'. . . President [Reagan] declared.").
' The perceived liability insurance crisis has received widespread media coverage,
including the cover story in Time magazine. Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is Canceled,
TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16, 26 (quoting Congressman Thomas Luken (D-Ohio):
"Probably no recent issue has snowballed so quickly."). However, the scope of the
crisis is unclear: "Depending on whose accountant you listen to, the insurance industry
...lost $5.5 billion or made $1.7 billion [in 1985]." Blakey, In Antitrust, Tort and
RICO Reform, Obvious Goals Cover Up Deep Issues, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 13, 1986, at 26.
Furthermore, the crisis is attributed to a variety of causes. The insurance industry
generally blames "a runaway legal system." Wayne, Insurance Industry Under Fire,
N.Y. Times, June 9, 1986, at D1, col. 2; see also Nickel, Back to Basics on Insurance
Reform, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20, 1986, at 11A, col. 1. Consumer advocates
assert that "the fundamental cause [of the crisis is] the sharp ups and downs of the
insurance industry's profit cycle." Hunter, Taming the Latest Insurance 'Crisis', N.Y.
Times, Apr. 13, 1986, at F3, col. 1; or, more specifically, "th[e] price wars of the early
1980's . . . ." Wayne, supra, at D1, col. 2. A third view attributes the crisis to both
"the insurance industry's business cycle. . .[and] the surge in costs associated with the
tort liability system." Birnbaum, Tort Reform Proposals Analyzed, NAT'L L.J., June
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to the controversy.3 State sovereignty over tort laws has resulted in fifty
sets of rules, and the injustices created by this situation are one cause
for concern. 4 A related problem is the uncertainty and the accompany-
ing costs associated with "[t]he present system of state common law
legal development and piecemeal state statutory reform . . ... , Yet
another major criticism focuses on the contingency fee contracts under
which product-liability lawyers traditionally operate and on the resul-
tant large fees that lawyers receive when their clients obtain large
awards.' The high transaction costs associated with the legal system
23, 1986, at 15. Similarly, the Tort Policy Working Group categorizes the causes into
two groups: "economic decisions and performance of the insurance industry" and "de-
velopments in tort law." TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP REPORT ON THE CAUSES,
EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAIL-
ABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 16 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP] (see in-
fra notes 62-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the origin and recommenda-
tions of the Tort Policy Working Group).
I See, e.g., WORKING GROUP, supra note 2, at 16-17 n.1 (state regulation of
insurance); Church, supra note 2, at 20 (increase in number of suits, size of jury
awards, and frivolous suits); Green, A Lawyer Faces Risks in Deciding To Take on
Costly Damage Suits, Wall St. J., May 23, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (contingency fee arrange-
ments for plaintiffs' lawyers); Wermiel, The Costs of Lawsuits, Growing Ever Larger,
Disrupt the Economy, Wall St. J., May 16, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (increasing costs of dam-
age awards).
4 See 131 CONG. REC. S18,321 (daily ed: Dec. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Dan-
forth) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Danforth] (referring to the present system as "a
legal lottery in which identical cases can produce different results in different jurisdic-
tions."); see also Schwartz & Bares, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law: A Solu-
tion That Will Work, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 351 (1984) (citing the need for federal re-
form of product liability law); Danforth, A Need for Uniform Laws, Faster Trials,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1985, at F2, col. 3 (labelling the present situation a "patchwork
of inconsistent and often contradictory state laws."). As one writer has observed, "Im-
agine a football game where the rules change every two yards. That would mean 50
sets of rules apply, depending on the location of the ball. Sound difficult? Not appar-
ently much more so than the nation's product liability law problem." Letter from the
Sporting Goods Manufacturers Ass'n to the Subcommittee on the Consumer of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, at 6 (Jan. 27, 1986)
[hereinafter Letter from the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Ass'n].
I Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action,
63 NEB. L. REV. 389, 394 (1984). The authors further state: "[The system] exacts high
costs from manufacturers, other sellers, insurers, and customers alike. These costs...
in great measure . . . reflect the price of uncertainty, rather than the cost of compen-
sating injured plaintiffs." (footnote omitted) Id. (Section III of this article provides a
detailed analysis of the effects of the uncertainty of the tort litigation system on insur-
ers, manufacturers, and consumers.) In testimony on S. 1999, Secretary of Commerce
Baldridge stated: "Another reason for the need for reform is the patchwork of different
State product liability laws which makes [sic] it difficult for businessmen to determine
which legal standard will apply to them or whether a particular standard will remain
constant." Product Liability Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (May 20, 1986) [hereinafter May Hearings on S. 1999] (statement of
Secretary of Commerce Baldridge).
I See 132 CONG. REC. S1193 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1986) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
[hereinafter Statement of Sen. Dodd]; 128 CONG. REc. S6846 (daily ed. June 16, 1982)
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have also sparked cries for reform.' The size of judgments,8 the differ-
ences in the size of awards for similar injuries,9 and the delay that often
(statement of Sen. Kasten); see also J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, & M.
SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 23 (1983) (concluding that for every 59
cents received by the plaintiff, lawyers get 99 cents: 41 cents to the plaintiff's attorney
and 58 cents to defendant's legal fees); Isikoff, Manville Creditors Oppose Settlement:
Group Charges Lawyers in Asbestos Case May Reap $1 Billion, Wash. Post, Feb. 15,
1986, at A4, col. 3; Isikoff, Defective-Product Claims Cause Legal Morass: Lawyers,
Not Victims, Are Source of Most Problems When Punitive Damages are Sought, Crit-
ics Claim, Wash. Post, Sept. 1, 1985, at M2, col. 1 [hereinafter Isikoff, Lawyers, Not
Victims]. But see Baldwin, Don't Debase a 200-Year-Old Tradition, N.Y. Times, Sept.
1, 1985, at F2, col. 3. See generally, Green, supra note 3 (discussing lawyer's risks in
contingency fee cases).
' "[T]he nation's tort liability system will cost $199 billion to handle bodily injury
claims over the next four years." Nolan, Liability Costs to Top US Deficit, J. CoM.,
Apr. 24, 1986, at 1A, col. 3 (citing study by the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Eco-
nomics at New York University). These costs include fees paid to lawyers and expert
witnesses; court costs; income foregone by jurors, witnesses, and litigants; and expenses
incurred in adjusting and processing claims forms. Id. In all, "for every dollar paid in
awards and settlements, between 25 and 34 cents was spent to administer the system."
Id. at 14A. State and federal government expenditures for processing civil cases in 1981
were estimated to be $2.2 billion. J. KAKALIK & R. Ross, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM xx (1983).
s In 1975, there were 12 million-dollar awards in personal injury cases (9 in prod-
uct liability cases), but by 1984 that number had jumped to 157 (86 in product liability
cases). WORKING GROUP, supra note 2, at 36-39 (citing Jury Verdict Research, Inc.,
Injury Valuation: Current Award Trends No. 304 (1986)). During this same period,
average product liability jury awards rose from $393,580 to $1,850,452. Id. at 36. One
recent cartoon shows the judge asking the jury foreman, "Excuse me, did the jury say
they were awarding the plaintiff 2.5 million or 2.5 billion dollars?" Wash. Post, Feb.
15, 1986, at A27, col. 2 (emphasis in original). In 1984, insurers and plaintiff compa-
nies paid $66.5 billion in claims and lawyers' fees; this amounted to 1.76% of the gross
national product. Wermiel, supra note 3, at 1, col. 6. But see Consumer Group Re-
leases Study Showing Moderate Increase inJury Awards, [Jan.-June] 14 Prod. Safety
& Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 381 (June 6, 1986) (citing study by the Consumer
Federation of America) ("Recent changes in average jury awards . . . mirror increases
in average wages, medical costs, life expectancy and population growth."). It should be
noted that most claims are settled without trial: one trial lawyer estimated that 90% of
cases are settled. Green, supra note 3, at 12, col. 2. Similarly, another trial lawyer
stated that only four percent of cases "go to jury verdict." Face the Nation, supra note
1, at 13. The monetary trends in settlements have not been studied thoroughly. "Al-
though many practitioners assume that trends in jury verdicts are reflected in settle-
ments, to date there has been no systematic analysis of settlement trends that would
allow us to confirm or contradict this assumption." Product Liability Voluntary Claims
and Uniform Standards Act: Hearings on S. 1999 Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
sumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 82 (1986) [hereinafter Product Liability Act Hearings] (statement of Deborah
R. Hensler, Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corp.).
9 Trials often produce "very dissimilar awards for very similar injuries."
O'Connell, A 'Neo No-Fault' Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of
Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 900 (1985). The Institute for
Civil Justice at the Rand Corporation concluded that the amount of money litigants
could expect to win or pay out depended not only on the injuries involved and the cause
of action but also on the litigants' personal characteristics. For example, in lawsuits
involving similar claims by plaintiffs who sustained comparable injuries, business de-
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occurs before injured parties are actually compensated have stirred crit-
icism.1l The increase in punitive damage awards comes at a time when
the basic rationale for imposing punitive damages has been ques-
tioned.11 With regard to insurance, the difficulty or inability of some
industries to obtain product liability insurance and the costs that they
incur when they do obtain insurance has been another source of con-
cern. l" Furthermore, some products are no longer available or the
fendants were assessed larger damages than individual defendants. The race of the liti-
gant also appeared to affect jury awards. Product Liability Act Hearings, supra note 8,
at 82 (statement of Hensler). A related problem is that "the tort system grossly over-
pays people with small losses, while underpaying people with the most serious losses."
PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1986)
[hereinafter S. REP. 27601. In general, compensation more than covered losses when the
claimant's economic loss was less than $100,000 but failed to cover even economic loss
when the loss exceeded $100,000. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY
CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 38 (1977).
10 See S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 3-4; Statement of Sen. Dodd, supra note 6;
see also Isikoff, Lawyers, Not Victims, supra note 6. The problems of delay are not
alleviated in cases that are settled: "[M]ost settlement negotiations get serious only a
week or so before trial is scheduled to begin." Green, supra note 3, at 12, col. 1. Under
the traditional tort system, it takes an average of five years to receive payment for a
claim. Product Liability Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
sumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1985) [hereinafter Product Liability Act Amendments] (statement of Sen.
Dodd).
11 See S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 49 ("[Plunitive damage awards have been
increasing both in size and in number in the past ten years."); Twerski, A Moderate
and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolu-
tion, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 575, 610-14 (1985) (and sources cited therein); Owen,
Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Prod-
ucts, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982); Birnbaum & Wheeler, Products Liability, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 40 ("Now, hardly a month goes by without a report of a
punitive damages verdict exceeding $1 million against a manufacturer, and appellate
courts regularly affirm punitive awards in excess of $1 million in product liability
cases.") (citations omitted). That companies can be forced to pay punitive damages
repeatedly for the same wrongful conduct has produced particular criticism. PRODUCT
LIABILITY ACT, S. REP. No. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1984). To remedy this
situation, S. 44 would have allowed punitive damages to be assessed only once for each
instance of alleged reckless conduct. See infra note 57 and accompanying text for a
more detailed discussion of S. 44. This limit on repeated awards of punitive damages
was "[plerhaps the most controversial provision of S. 44." Cohen, Legal Analysis of the
"Product Liability Act" (S. 100, 99th Congress) As Introduced, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 41 (Feb. 12, 1985). This provision was de-
leted from subsequent bills considered by the Subcommittee on the Consumer. Id.
12 The Tort Policy Working Group report provides extensive figures on recent
insurance premium increases by type of insurance and by sector of the economy, but it
does not produce overall averages. WORKING GROUP, supra note 2, at 6-13. Insurance
premiums for businesses in Philadelphia, for example, rose by an average of 172% in
1985. Fish, Poll Finds Insurers Escape Blame for Crisis, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar.
26, 1986, at 1G, col. 2. By comparison, during the insurance crisis of the 1970s, prod-
uct liability insurance premiums rose by an estimated average of 280% between 1971
and 1976. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD. LIAB., FINAL REPORT I1-11 (1977)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. Examples abound of firms that have been forced to close
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range of product offerings is limited because of the costs or unavailabil-
ity of liability insurance.13 Finally, the fact that product liability insur-
ance premiums are much higher in the United States than abroad and
thus place American firms at a serious competitive disadvantage in in-
ternational trade 4 has raised concerns during this period of record
because of dramatically higher insurance premiums. See Church, supra note 2. The
Letter from the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Ass'n, supra note 4, at 2, states that, on
average, manufacturers' product liability costs amount to 4.2% of sales. This letter cites
numerous cases of firms being forced to cease producing various products because they
were unable to obtain adequate insurance coverage. But see Sugarman, Doing Away
with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 570-71 (1985) (citing G. EADS & P. REUTER,
DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LAW AND REG-
ULATION (1983)) (in 1978, insurance premiums plus settlement and administrative
costs on average amounted to less than 0.2% of sales; in manufacturing, no industry's
costs exceeded 0.6% of sales); Hollings, Preserving the Vitality of Tort Law, TRIAL,
Feb. 1984, at 104 ("[P]roducts liability insurance costs have never exceeded one percent
of gross sales in the vast majority of industries."). See generally Reed & Watkins,
supra note 5, at 429-36 (discussing the unavailability, partial unavailability, and af-
fordability of product liability insurance); Danforth, supra note 4 (discussing unpre-
dictable insurance costs that force many companies to forego maintaining adequate in-
surace coverage).
S Vaccines present a particularly poignant tale. The benefits of immunization
programs (in terms of lives saved, suffering avoided, and increased national wealth
through reduced costs of treatment) are well documented. Boffey, Vaccine Liability
Threatens Supplies, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1984, at C1, C13, col. 1 (quoting American
Medical Association Report: "Of all the armaments of medicine, vaccines offer the
greatest potential benefit to the greatest number of persons."). See generally GUIDE
FOR ADULT IMMUNIZATION (T. Eickhoff ed. 1985). Based on recent trends, however,
"it appears that the tort system's vagaries will ultimately drive mass immunization
programs out of the private sector altogether." Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 289
(1985). As a result of increased liability costs, prices of vaccines are skyrocketing. Mur-
phy, A Comeback for Whooping Cough, TIME, June 30, 1986, at 78 (the price of the
whooping cough vaccine rose from $0.45 in 1982 to $11.40 in 1985, with $8.00 of the
cost being placed in a "liability reserve"). Nineteen vaccines are produced by only one
domestic manufacturer. The Cost of Ignoring Vaccine Victims, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1984, at A18, col. 1. "The chief worry is that in cases where there is only a single
manufacturer of a vaccine, the supply could be disrupted by an unexpected manufac-
turing problem, a bad batch of vaccine, a strike by employees, or a decision by the last
manufacturer to abandon the market." Boffey, Vaccine Liability, supra, at C13, col. 1.
"And there is every reason to fear that innovation in the development, mass-production,
and distribution of new safer vaccines [would] be thoroughly stifled" and that research
geared toward producing new vaccines would decrease. Huber, supra, at 289-90, 290
n.62. Other specific examples of products and services endangered by escalating liabil-
ity insurance premiums include drug capsules, Kronholm, Insurance Firms May Deter-
mine the Future of Capsules, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 22, 1986, at 8D, col. 1;
birth-control devices, Galen, Birth Control Options Limited by Litigation, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 20, 1986, at 1; day-care centers and biotechnology firms, WORKING GROUP, supra
note 2, at 10-11. Congress did, however, address the vaccine issue in 1986. National
Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 3755. This measure established a "no-fault compensation system for the
families of children injured by vaccines." Major Provisions of Nine-Part Omnibus
Health Bill, CONG. Q., Nov. 22, 1986, at 2952.
14 Danforth, supra note 4, at F2, col. 1 ("The [current] product liability system
1987]
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trade deficits. These considerations have led commentators to advocate a
variety of reforms,"5 including abolishing tort law actions for personal
injuries,"6 instituting changes at the state level, 17 adopting limited fed-
eral legislation addressing only the most critical issues, 8 and imple-
menting a sweeping federal product liability law. 9
This Comment focuses on one proposed solution, the Product Lia-
bility Reform Act, S. 2760, on which the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation reported favorably to the full Sen-
ate in June 1986.20 Section 2 presents an overview of the current state
of the law of product liability in the United States. Section 3 covers the
provisions of the Product Liability Reform Act and analyzes whether
these provisions will alleviate the problems that they are designed to
correct. Section 4 analyzes the state of product liability law in the
United Kingdom and the trends occurring there. Finally, Section 5
compares and contrasts the Product Liability Reform Act with the sys-
tem in the United Kingdom.
Although the rationale underlying the proposals contained in the
... hurts ... our competitive position in world markets."); Malott, Litigation
Mentality: U.S., Europe, Japan, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spr. 1986, at 14 ("[S]ome
U.S. manufacturers of machine tools and textile machinery must support liability pre-
miums that are 20 to 100 times greater than those paid by their foreign competi-
tors .... Over the last five years, [one Fortune 500 company's] total insurance ex-
penses in the U.S. . . . have cost five times as much as [its] insurance premiums in
international markets."); Schwartz & Bares, supra note 4, at 353 n.9 ("American in-
surance rates are estimated to be 20 times higher than those in Europe."); Whincup,
Product Liability Laws in Common Market Countries, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
521, 538 (1982) ("astronomical awards" in the United States); Letter from the Sport-
ing Goods Manufacturers Ass'n, supra note 4, at 4 (in several industries, such as pro-
duction of hockey equipment, American manufacturers no longer compete because of
high product liability costs; thus, these markets have been abandoned to foreign
producers).
" For arguments regarding many product liability reform issues, see Product Lia-
bility Act Amendments, supra note 10; Product Liability Act: Hearings on S. 100
Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1985) [hereinafter S. 100 Hearings];
Product Liability Act: Hearings on S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 84
(1983) [hereinafter S. 44 Hearings]. But see Blakey, supra note 2, at 26 (" '[T]ort law
reform' is a euphemism for choosing to enhance the power of one side in an adversary
system, which would move the clock not forward to ... the 21st century, but back-
ward to restore a discredited 19th century system where only the well-to-do would have
lawyers.").
"0 See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 12, at 659-60.
17 See, e.g., May Hearings on S. 1999, supra note 5, at 120 (statement of Harry
L. Carrico, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, on behalf of the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices).
1s See, e.g., Twerski, supra note 11, at 619-27.
19 See, e.g., Schwartz & Bares, supra note 4; Reed & Watkins, supra note 5, at
471.
20 See infra notes 75-110 and accompanying text.
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Product Liability Reform Act is sound and the need for reform in the
United States is great, the measures incorporated in this Act address
only a few of the faults of the current system. This Act fails to supply
the comprehensive reform that is needed to alleviate the current
problems and to create a system that avoids these numerous pitfalls.
Therefore, the Product Liability Reform Act should be rejected, and
efforts should be renewed in the 100th Congress to draft and adopt a
comprehensive federal reform of the product liability system.
2. PRODUCT LIABILITY OVERVIEW
Product liability laws have evolved dramatically in the United
States over the past twenty years. Originally, American courts adopted
the doctrine of caveat emptor and only recognized the liability of the
seller of a product in instances of fraud.2" The law gradually evolved so
that both implied and express warranty theories of recovery were rec-
ognized.22 Only in 1916 did the theory of negligence begin to gain
broad acceptance by American courts in the product liability context.23
By 1966, every American jurisdiction had accepted this theory.24 How-
ever, before Mississippi became the fiftieth state to adopt the doctrine
of negligence, the California courts had already adopted the theory of
strict liability, holding that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury
to a human being."'25 In 1965, the Restatement (Second) of Torts incor-
porated this concept.26 A 1978 report found that thirty-six states had
19 W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 679 (5th ed.
1984).
22 Id.
2S MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see W.
KEETON, supra note 21, at 682-83.
2" Mississippi was the last state to adopt the theory of negligence in the context of
product liability. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966); see
Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 comment a (1965) (stating that the theory of negligence has
been "all but universally accepted by the American courts").
2" Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, (1963). Strict liability in the context of abnormally dangerous
activities had been an accepted legal doctrine since the 19th century. See Rylands v.
Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868). See generally Wade, Strict Tort Lia-
bility for Products: Past, Present and Future, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 335 (1984).
"* RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
1987]
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adopted the strict liability doctrine while only three had expressly re-
jected it,27 and a leading treatise stated that in 1984 "nearly all states
have adopted some version of [strict liability]. 28 Thus, product liability
law, which is based largely on case law,29 now provides a claimant with
three alternative theories on which to base a claim: negligence in tort,
breach of warranty, and strict liability in tort.
In practice, these alternative theories are not always clearly distin-
guishable. Courts have utilized more than one theory in the same
case,30 producing confusion and uncertainty. 1 The confusion stemming
from these alternatives has led some commentators to advocate relying
on only one theory."2
Furthermore, state courts have employed differing standards to in-
terpret each of these theories. For example, although proof of a "de-
fect" is a prerequisite for applying the strict liability doctrine, "the only
consensus regarding the present meaning of 'defect' is that there is no
consensus."3'3 Therefore, although the Restatement required that a
product be defective and unreasonably dangerous, the California Su-
preme Court rejected the latter prong, holding "that to require an in-
jured plaintiff to prove not only that the product contained a defect but
also that such defect made the product unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer would place a considerably greater burden upon him
than that articulated in Greenman."4 Some courts have followed the
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
"[fln many respects [the Restatement] did not restate the law of strict products liablity
so much as state it." Reed & Watkins, supra note 5, at 399 (emphasis in original).
27 Reed & Watkins, supra note 5, at 398 n. 38 (citing REPORT OF THE SENATE
PRODS. LIAB. STUDY COMM., GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY 4 (1978)).
28 W. KEETON, supra note 21, at 694.
29 Reed & Watkins, supra note 5, at 391; Schwartz & Bares, supra note 4, at
353.
SO See, e.g., Oldham's Farm Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177 (Mo.
App. 1982) (plaintiff recovered on a combination of strict liability in tort and express
and implied warranties); see also W. KEETON, supra note 21, at 694.
31 Twerski, supra note 11, at 580-99.
"2 See, e.g., Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825 (1973).
" Reed & Watkins, supra note 5, at 399; see also Sherman, Legislative Re-
sponses to Judicial Activism in Strict Liability: Reform or Reaction?, 44 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 359, 362-63 (1978).
34 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 134-35, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 443 (1972); cf. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573
P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978) ("[A] product may alternatively be
found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proxi-
mately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant
factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of
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California formulation38 while other courts have favored the Restate-
ment approach."
The distinctions regarding other product liability concepts, such as
what constitutes a design defect 7 and the extent of a manufacturer's
duty to warn,38 add to the differences that exist among the states.3 '
Furthermore, new developments indicate that product liability laws are
still undergoing change.
One such evolving area of the law concerns the liability of produc-
ers of harmful products that are produced in a generic form by several
firms. Plaintiffs often were unable to identify the manufacturer of the
particular product that caused their harm and, therefore, were pre-
cluded from obtaining damages. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories" is
widely recognized as a landmark case in this area.41 In Sindell, the
California Supreme Court expressly rejected the more limiting alterna-
dangers inherent in such design.").
See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
8 See, e.g., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Phil-
lips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). For a discussion of
various interpretations of unreasonably dangerous, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 12,
at 11-7. See also Schwartz & Bares, supra note 4, at 353.
17 Compare Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-
38 (1978) (a product may be held to be defective if "[f]irst, . . . the product failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner [or] [s]econd, . . . the benefits of the challenged design
[do not] outweigh the risk of the danger inherent in such design.") with O'Brien v.
Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 185, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983) (a product may be found
to be defective "[ejven if there are no alternative methods for making [such prod-
ucts]. . . ."). Nor have state courts agreed on the standard to be used in determining
liability in design defect cases. See, e.g., Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 465, 525 P.2d
125, 129 (1974) (analyzing the distinctions between strict liability and negligence in the
design defect context and selecting strict liability as the proper standard). But see
Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238, 432 A.2d 925, 929 (1981) (ar-
guing that the Oregon court in Phillips, despite its attempt to "repudiate the negligence
approach," in fact "retained indicia of that very theory.").
" Compare Bethesda v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982) (holding a manufacturer liable for failure to warn even though the manufac-
turer could not at the time have known of the dangers) with Woodill v. Parke Davis &
Co., 79 Ill.2d 26, 37, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1980) (stating that "[t]o hold a manufac-
turer liable for failure to warn of a danger of which it would be impossible to know
based on the present state of human knowledge would make the manufacturer the vir-
tual insurer of the product . . . ."). For a discussion of the differences among states in
the application of "state-of-the-art" rules, see Twerski, supra note 11, at 591-94.
"' See Reed & Watkins, supra note 5; Elfin, Product Liability Law Reform: A
Critique of Proposed Federal Legislation, 1984 S. ILL. U.L. REV. 579, 580-81; Twer-
ski, supra note 11; Cohen, Products Liability: Some Legal Issues, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS No. 84-189A (Jan. 3, 1978, updated
Nov. 1, 1984); W. KEETON, supra note 21, at 694.
"o 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1981).
41 See, e.g., Leighton, Market Share Liability, TRIAL, Nov. 1985 (and sources
cited therein).
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tive liability doctrine' 2 and instead imposed liability under the market-
share theory. The Sindell court, however, refused to apply two other
theories under which liability could have been imposed: concert of ac-
tion and enterprise liability.43 No consensus, however, has emerged in
this area: since Sindell, various courts have reached conflicting conclu-
sions regarding the relevant theories."" Thus, manufacturers of harmful
generic products are subjected to liability only in some states. Even in
those states, the extent of their liability differs because the conflicting
theories affect cases disparately. This situation creates inequities for
similarly situated plaintiffs. Furthermore, it adversely affects manufac-
turers because they are unable to evaluate the extent of their liability
and thus their potential costs.
Thus, states have adopted differing theories for imposing liability
and even differing rules for applying these theories. These various laws
impose a myriad of rules on national manufacturers. When this multi-
tude of rules is viewed in combination with the problems of delay, un-
certainty, large awards, high transaction costs, and the insurance cri-
42 See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (holding that,
when both possible tortfeasors are before the court but the court is unable to determine
which party is at fault, both parties can be held jointly and severally liable).
43 26 Cal.3d at 607-10, 607 P.2d at 933-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141-43. The con-
cert of action theory requires that the tortfeasors act together; under this doctrine, each
party is liable for the entire amount. Id. The enterprise theory applies when the parties
act as one firm when committing the tort. Id.
44 "[T]he majority of courts have dismissed a plaintiff's cause of action when she
could not identify the brand of DES taken by her mother." Novak, Into the Quagmire:
Washington Adopts Market Share Liability in DES Cases, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 199, 199
(1985/86). Some courts have, however, imposed liability, utilizing various doctrines.
See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 883 (1984) (reversing grant of summary judgment against plaintiff because claims
of alternative liability and concert of action theory do establish a cause of action); Col-
lins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826
(1984) (adopting the "risk contribution theory," a variant of the market-share doctrine,
while specifically rejecting the concerted action, alternative, enterprise, and market-
share liability doctrines); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D.
1983) (order granting summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff was unable to
prove source of harmful DES), rev'd on other grounds 575 F. Supp. 228 (D.S.D.
1983), af'd, 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102
Wash.2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (adopting a "market share alternative liability"
doctrine while specifically rejecting the theories of alternative liability, concerted action,
enterprise liability, and Sindell market-share liability); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55
N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (affirming imposition of liabil-
ity based on concert of action theory but expressly not ruling on "whether other theo-
ries of liability [such as alternative, enterprise, or market-share liability] may in the
DES context establish a cause of action."); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980) (manufacturer could be held liable on alternative
liability theory). See generally Leighton, supra note 41 (discussing the need for mar-
ket-share liability in spite of practical difficulties).
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sis,4 5 the true magnitude of the problems inherent in the current
product liability system in the United States becomes apparent in terms
of inequities among plaintiffs and economic inefficiencies.
Many commentators believe that these problems cannot be solved
at the state level because reforms independently enacted by various
states would not address the problem of different product liability laws
among the states.46 Nor does the Uniform Product Liability Act 47 pre-
sent the solution to the problem. This uniform law has not eliminated
the differing standards because, as of 1984, only four states had
adopted any of the sections of the Uniform Act4 and none had enacted
the Uniform Act in its entirety.49 Furthermore, because state courts are
independent, they are likely to put their own gloss on such a statute,
just as they interpret other product liability doctrines differently. Thus,
many commentators are strongly urging Congress to enact a federal
product liability statute.50
3. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE AND THE PRODUCT LIABILITY RE-
FORM ACT
3.1. Historical Perspective
In 1976, in response to the product liability insurance crisis of the
mid-1970s, the Ford Administration created the Federal Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability, chaired by the Commerce Depart-
ment.5" In 1978, a second task force, the Task Force on Product Liabil-
45 See supra notes 4-14 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Schwartz & Bares, supra note 4; Reed & Watkins, supra note 5;
Elfin, supra note 39; Barron, supra note 1.
State reforms adopted this year have focused on four areas: (1) reducing the size of
awards handed down by juries, including limits on non-economic losses and punitive
damages; (2) increasing regulation of insurance companies; (3) instituting new insur-
ance financing mechanisms, such as self-insurance; and (4) imposing data-reporting
requirements for insurance companies. Id.; see also Kristof, supra note 1.
17 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612, 14,627 (1978).
"' See 27 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-572m - r (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO
CODE §§ 6-1401 - 1409 (Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3301 - 06 (1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.72.010 - .060 (Supp. 1985).
', See Elfin, supra note 39; Schwartz & Bares, supra note 4, at 355.
50 See supra note 46. Generally, business associations have favored tort law re-
forms whereas consumer groups and trial lawyers have praised the current system. The
Reagan Administration favors a federal product liability law. May Hearings on S.
1999, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Secretary of Commerce Baldridge) ("The Fed-
eral Government must take a leadership role in the process of developing a coherent
product liability system."). For more detailed exposition of the positions of various or-
ganizations, see Product Liability Act Amendments, supra note 10; S. 100 Hearings,
supra note 15; S. 44 Hearings, supra note 15. For a discussion of the power of the
trial lawyers' lobby, see Green, supra note 3.
51 S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 9.
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ity and Accident Compensation, recommended that a federal product
liability law be drafted. 2 The Carter Administration rejected this pro-
posal and countered with the proposed Model Uniform Product Liabil-
ity Act.83 Few states, however, have adopted the provisions of the Uni-
form Act."
As a result of the recommendations of these task forces and also
the states' lack of response to the Uniform Act, pressure again mounted
for federal action in the 1980s,"5 and legislation was introduced in Con-
gress to create a federal product liability law.56 The Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation [hereinafter Committee]
approved product liability bills in both the 97th and 98th Congresses
(S. 2631 and S. 44, respectively), but Congress adjourned each time
without any action having been taken by the full Senate.5 7 In 1985,
product liability bill S. 10058 failed to gain the approval of the Com-
mittee." Despite the similarities between S. 100 and S. 44, the Com-
mittee approved S. 44 but rejected S. 100; observers felt that the failure
of S. 100 may have been due, in large part, to the perception that the
bill was too favorable to manufacturers. s
Subsequent to the failure of S. 100, several amendments in the
form of substitute bills were introduced, and a series of hearings were
held by the Subcommittee on the Consumer."1 In October 1985, the
52 Id.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
" See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
5 See Reed & Watkins, supra note 5; Hollings, supra note 12.
" Among the bills introduced in the House of Representatives were H.R. 5626,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 7000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 5214, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 5261, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); and H.R. 2729, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
51 In 1982, S. 2631 was passed unanimously by the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation. S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
This bill was reintroduced in the 98th Congress and was labeled S. 44. After a series of
amendments, the bill was reported out of committee by a vote of 11-5. S. REP. No.
476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter S. REP. 476]. Because of the pressure of
other pending legislation, the bill again failed to receive the attention of the entire
Senate.
" S. 100 was "substantially the same as S. 44." S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 9.
The changes between S. 44 and S. 100 primarily related to the punitive damages
provisions.
" The bill died in the Committee on May 16, 1985, when the vote to recommend
the bill to the full Senate was tied 8-8. S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 11.
eo Interview with Andrew Koppelman, Staff Member of the Subcommittee on the
Consumer of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in
Wash., D.C. (Feb. 12, 1986) (hereinafter Remarks of Koppelman). See generally Hol-
lings, supra note 12 (discussing problems with product liability legislation that does not
provide adequately for the interests of consumers and workers).
61 On March 19, 1985 and May 14, 1985, respectively, Sens. Dodd and Gorton
introduced amendments in the nature of substitutes to S. 100 (although they were com-
[Vol. 9:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss2/5
FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM
Attorney General established the Tort Policy Working Group, an in-
teragency group consisting of representatives of ten agencies and the
White House.62 The Working Group issued its report and recommen-
dations in February 1986.63 Finally, on June 3, 1986, the Committee
began to markup a new federal product liability bill."
At the opening of the markup session, Sen. Danforth stated that
he had become " 'less ambitious' in recent months" regarding the scope
plete substitutes for the bill, they were labeled amendments) that would establish an
alternative, expedited claim system; these amendments were labeled S. Amend. No. 16
and S. Amend. No. 100, respectively. Cohen, Products Liability Bills: Comparison of
S. 100 and H.R. 2568, 99th Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Li-
BRARY OF CONGRESS No. 85-899A, at 1, n.1 (July 16, 1985). Based on these two
amendments, the Committee Staff drafted two bills on the subject. Staff Working Draft
#1, July 15, 1985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.; Staff Working Draft #2, Nov. 27, 1985, 99th
Cong, 1st Sess. Senator Danforth discussed the second draft on the Senate floor on
December 20, 1985. Statement of Sen. Danforth, supra note 4. The draft was mistak-
enly designated as a new bill and labeled S. 1999; to avoid confusion (Remarks of
Koppelman, supra note 60), Sen. Danforth allowed the bill's mistaken designation to
remain but stressed that the "text is still in the drafting stages . . . ." 131 CONG. REG.
S18,410 (daily ed. Dec. 30, 1985) (statement of Sen. Danforth). (S. 1999 was co-spon-
sored by Sen. Dodd, 132 CONG. REc. S1193 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Dodd); and Sen. Kassebaum, 132 CONG. REc. S858 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986); S. 1999 is
printed at 131 CONG. REc. S18,410 (daily ed. Dec. 30, 1985). One of the innovative
aspects of S. 1999 was its powerful expedited claim system, set forth in Title II of the
bill. The hearings before the Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation on February 27, 1986 and March 11, 1986,
however, revealed little political support for this provision. Product Liability Act Hear-
ings, supra note 8; Interview with Andrew Koppelman, Staff Member of the Subcom-
mittee on the Consumer of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation in Wash., D.C. (Aug. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Remarks of Koppelman III.
Accordingly, three different amendments, each in the form of substitute bills, were in-
troduced by Sens. Kasten, Danforth, and Gorton: (1) Sen. Kasten's amendment to S.
100 was labeled S. Amend. No. 1814, 132 CONG. Rc. S5106 (daily ed. Apr. 30,
1986), and incorporated many of the recommendations of the Tort Policy Working
Group (see WORKING GROUP, supra note 2); (2) Sen. Danforth's amendment replaced
the expedited claim system with an expedited settlement system (this amendment to S.
1999 was co-sponsored by Sen. Dodd and was labeled S. Amend. 1951, 132 CONG.
REc. S5106 (daily ed. May 12, 1986); and (3) Sen. Gorton's amendment to S. 1999
was labeled S. Amend. No. 1968, 132 CONG. REc. S6232 (daily ed. May 20, 1986).
The subcommittee held further hearings on these various proposals on May 19 and 20,
1986. May Hearings on S. 1999, supra note 5.
6' WORKING GROUP, supra note 2, at 1.
13 The Working Group concluded that little "can or should be done" by any gov-
ernment regarding the economic factors underlying the liability insurance crisis.
WORKING GROUP, supra note 2, at 60. The Working Group did, however, issue eight
tort law reform proposals: (1) retain fault as the basis for liability; (2) base causation
findings only on credible evidence and opinions; (3) eliminate joint and several liability;
(4) impose limits on non-economic damages; (5) permit future economic damage
awards to be paid periodically; (6) reduce awards by the amount received for the same
injury by the claimant from collateral sources; (7) impose a schedule on contingency
fees; and (8) develop alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Id. at 60-75.
"' S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 12.
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of reforms that he considered to be possible. 5 Sen. Hollings, the Com-
mittee's ranking minority member and a leading opponent of efforts to
enact federal product liability reforms, contended that Congress was
"not the proper entity to solve the problem" and that there was no
reason to send out a "lynching party" for the current litigation sys-
tem. 6 After six contentious markup sessions during the month of
June,6 7 the Committee approved a federal product liability bill (later
known as S. 2760) by a vote of 10 to 7 on June 26, 1986.68
On September 17, 1986, the Product Liability Reform Act was
debated on the Senate floor.6" Procedural maneuverings prevented any
substantive action on the measure.7 0 On September 22, 1986, Sen. Kas-
ten announced a "bipartisan compromise" to eliminate the most contro-
versial provision contained in S. 2760, caps on damage awards .7  Fur-
65 Senate Commerce Committee Markup Session Leads to No Votes; New Meeting
Expected, [Jan.-June] 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 379 (June 6,
1986) (quoting Sen. Danforth).
66 Id. (quoting Sen. Hollings).
67 See Senate Panel Accepts 'Consensus' Draft, Adopts California Joint Liability
Rule, [Jan.-June] 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 396 (June 13,
1986); Fault-Based Liability Provision Rejected in Senate Committee Markup, [Jan.-
June] 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 420 (June 20, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Provision Rejected]; Product Liability Reform Bill Approved by Senate Commerce
Committee, [Jan.-June] 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 448 (June 27,
1986) [hereinafter Bill Approved].
" S. REP. 2760, supra note 9; see also Bill Approved, supra note 67. Voting to
report the bill to the full Senate were: Sens. Danforth (R-Mo.), Goldwater (R-Ariz.),
Kassebaum (R-Kan.), Pressler (R-S.D.), Kasten (R-Wis.), Trible (R-Va.), Long (D-
La.), Ford (D-Ky.), Exon (D-Neb.), and Rockefeller (D-W.Va.). Voting against re-
porting the bill were: Sens. Packwood (R-Or.), Gorton (R-Wash.), Stevens (R-Alaska),
Hollings (D-S.C.), Inouye (D-Haw.), Riegle (D-Mich.), and Gore (D-Tenn.).
Hearings on S. 2760 were held by the Senate Judiciary Committee on September
10, 1986. Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judici-
ary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 1986). Kasten, Danforth Support Reform Bill in Tes-
timony Before Judiciary Committee, [July-Dec.] 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 37, at 647 (Sept. 12, 1986) [hereinafter Kasten, Danforth Support Bill]. The Ju-
diciary Committee did not have the power to markup the bill: the Commerce Commit-
tee did not agree to sequential referral of the bill because the two committees failed to
reach an agreement regarding the ground rules for such referral. Remarks of Koppel-
man II, supra note 61. While Sens. Kasten and Danforth urged support for S. 2760,
Sen. Metzenbaum described the bill as an insurance "industry wish list." Kasten, Dan-
forth Support Bill, supra.
69 Product Liability Reform Bill Debated Briefly on Senate Floor, [July-Dec.] 14
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 664 (Sept. 19, 1986).
70 Id.
7' Senate Bill Gets Wide Support in Test Vote, Then Is Laid Aside, [July-Dec.]
14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 681 (Sept. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Bill
Gets Wide Support]. The deleted provision contained caps on awards for non-economic
damages in instances in which the defendant volunteered a settlement offer that the
plaintiff had rejected. See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. The new bill,
labeled S. Amend. No. 2868, was sponsored by Sens. Kasten, Kassebaum, Gorton, Ste-
vens, Inouye, and Riegle. The bill is printed at 132 CONG. REc. S13,235 (daily ed.
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ther parliamentary maneuvering occurred on September 25, 1986,
and both proponents and opponents of S. 2760 claimed victory.73 Ulti-
mately, Congress adjourned for the third straight session before the full
Senate could act on a product liability reform measure on which the
Committee had reported favorably.
7 4
3.2. The Provisions of the Product Liability Reform Act
The Product Liability Reform Act, S. 2760, consists of four ti-
tles.75 Title I establishes the framework within which the Act is to be
interpreted and provides for the total preemption of state laws "to the
extent that this Act establishes a rule of law applicable to any such
recovery. T"7  By limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases
involving diversity of citizenship,77 the Act neither expands the jurisdic-
Sept. 22, 1986).
71 Bill Gets Wide Support, supra note 71.
73 Id. at 682. Sen. Kasten claimed that senators opposing the amended bill "don't
want to stand up and be counted" and that "there are at least 70 votes in favor of the
[amended] bill." An aide to Sen. Hollings described the bill's supporters' procedural
votes as tactical moves designed to avoid revealing the supporters' identity and strength.
Victory for supporters of the bill was claimed by the staff of the Subcommittee on the
Consumer. Telephone Interview with Andrew Koppelman, Staff Member of the Sub-
committee on the Consumer of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation (Oct. 20, 1986) [hereinafter Remarks of Koppelman III] (it was "clear
that the votes were there to get some sort of bill through" the Senate).
' Similarly, although many states enacted reforms in 1986 (see Barron, supra
note 1; Kristof, supra note 1), the drive for state tort law reforms slowed toward the
end of the summer. Hilder, Insurers' Push to Limit Civil Damage Awards Begins to
Slow Down, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 6. Movement for tort reform resur-
faced in 1987. Strasser, 1987 Focus on States: Both Sides Brace for Tort Battle,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 3 ("Civil justice reform. . . has become a burn-
ing political issue, and one that is about to ignite again as legislators around the coun-
try return to their state capitals for a new round of lawmaking.").
75 S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
71 Id. § 103(b). Other provisions of Title I include:
(a) This Act governs any civil action brought against a manufacturer or
product seller, on any theory, for harm caused by a product. A civil action
brought against a manufacturer or product seller for loss or damage to a
product itself or for commercial loss is not subject to this Act ....
(b) This Act supersedes any State law regarding recovery for harm caused
by a product only to the extent that this Act establishes a rule of law
applicable to any such recovery. Any issue arising under this Act that is
not governed by any such rule of law shall be governed by applicable State
of [sic] Federal law ...
(e) This Act shall be construed and applied after consideration of its legis-
lative history to promote uniformity of law in the various jurisdictions.
Id. § 103(a),(b), & (e).
Thus, "[a]ny issue arising in an action governed by this legislation that is not governed
by a rule of law established by the legislation shall be governed by applicable State
common and statutory law." S. RaP. 2760, supra note 9, at 28.
7 S. 2760 § 104: "The district courts of the United States shall not have jurisdic-
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tion nor increases the caseload of the federal courts.78 Title I also pro-
vides definitions for specific statutory language.
79
Title II of the Act creates an expedited product liability claims
procedure. No new liability standard is created; rather, this procedure
is designed (1) to encourage early settlements in order to reduce litiga-
tion and thereby alleviate the "present system's huge transactions costs"
and (2) to provide victims of product-related accidents "greater cer-
tainty of recovery" and "a fairer level of compensation more quickly."80
Under this procedure," a claimant may include a settlement offer
in the complaint that is limited to the claimant's full net economic loss82
tion over any civil action pursuant to this Act, based on section 1331 [federal questions]
or 1337 [acts of Congress regulating Commerce] of title 28, United States Code."
78 S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 30.
79 S. 2760 § 102.
Provisions in S. 1999 dealing with service of process, establishing the sufficiency of
expert testimony, creating a Product Liability Review Panel, and imposing on lawyers
the duty to disclose to a client his options under the bill and the implications of each
option of pursuing a claim do not appear in S. 2760. Provisions requiring the disclosure
of attorneys' fees and limiting contingent attorneys' fees to amounts based on a sliding
scale were rejected by the Committee during markup. Provision Rejected, supra note
67. For a discussion of the controversial disclosure provision in S. 1999, see Moore,
Disclosure Provision Added in Product Liability Bill, Legal Times, Jan. 13, 1986, at
4, col. 1. Provisions prohibiting the admissibility of admissions of liability under the
expedited claims procedure are, of course, no longer relevant. However, a provision
similar to that contained in section 109 of S. 1999, limiting the admissibility of reme-
dial actions in order to prove liability, appears as section 310(b) in S. 2760. See infra
note 106.
so S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 31, 35.
S 5. 2760 § 201(b):
Any claimant may, in addition to any claim for relief made in accordance
with State law, include in such claimant's complaint an offer of settlement.
For the purposes of this title, an offer of settlement shall be limited to a
claim for payment of the claimant's net economic loss .. and any digni-
tary loss.
82 "Net economic loss" includes:
(A) reasonable expenses incurred for reasonably needed and used medical
and rehabilitation care and services;
(B) lost income . . . reduced by any income earned from substitute work
actually performed by the claimant or by income the claimant would have
earned in available appropriate work which the claimant was capable of
performing but unreasonably failed to undertake;
(C) reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining ordinary and necessary ser-
vices in lieu of those the claimant would have performed, not for income,
but for the the benefit of the claimant or the claimant's immediate family
(D) lost earnings of a deceased person who suffered fatal harm. . . which
[earnings] . . . would have been contributed to claimants. . .; and
(E) reasonable expenses incurred by the claimant in preparation and sub-
mission of an offer of settlement or a response pursuant to section 201 ...
including a reasonable attorney's fee, less the total amount of collateral
benefits paid or payable to the claimaint by reason of the same harm[.]
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and $100,000 for any dignitary loss. 8 3 If the complaint does not include
such an offer, any defendant may make a settlement offer with similar
restrictions." Once a settlement offer is made and accepted, all of the
litigation is dismissed; the court, however, retains jurisdiction to resolve
any residual disputes regarding the claimant's net economic loss.85
Id. § 102(a)(11).
However, lost income under subsection (a)(1 1)(B) is reduced by any applicable federal,
state, and local income taxes as well as by Social Security and payroll taxes applicable
to such income, if these taxes do not apply to compensation received under S. 2760. Id.
§ 102(b)(1).
1 "Dignitary loss" is defined as:
noneconomic loss resulting from harm caused by a product, compensable
under State law, in the amount of $100,000, and consisting of pain and
suffering or mental anguish associated with (A) the death of a parent,
child or spouse; (B) serious and permanent disfigurement; (C) loss of a
limb or organ; or (D) serious and permanent impairment of a bodily
function ...
Id. § 102(a)(6).
s, Id. § 201(c):
Any defendant in such an action may make an offer of settlement for the
claimant's net economic loss and any dignitary loss . . . within ninety
days after service of the claimant's complaint, or within the time permitted
. . . for the responsive pleading . . . except that if such pleading includes
a motion to dismiss . . . the defendant may make such an offer to the
claimant within ten days after the court's determination regarding such
motion.
The recipient of a settlement offer must respond in writing within 90 days after
the date such offer is made. Id. § 201 (d)(2). This time period may be extended in order
for the court to resolve disputes concerning the validity of the inclusion or exclusion of
dignitary loss. Id. § 201(d)(3). The court must rule as a matter of law on such matters
within 15 days. Id. If the court finds the offer invalid, a new offer can be made within
10 days, and the recipient again has 90 days within which to respond. Id. If the court,
however, finds the offer to be valid, "there shall be a period of ten days in addition to
the applicable time period under this section in which the recipient may respond
." Id. § 201(d)(3). The Committee Report expressed the belief that such disputes
will only arise in a small fraction of product liability cases, because in most cases it is
obvious whether the claimant has suffered dignitary loss. . . . Usually there should be
no dispute as to whether a claimant's injuries fit this description." S. REP. 2760, supra
note 9, at 33. This time period may also be extended by a court order to permit
discovery:
Any such order shall contain a schedule for discovery of evidence material
to the issues of the circumstances of the harm and the appropriate amount
of relief, and shall not extend such period for more than ninety days. Any
such action shall be accompanied by a supporting affidavit of the moving
party setting forth the reasons why such extension is necessary to promote
the interests of justice and stating that the information likely to be discov-
ered is material and is not, after reasonable inquiry, otherwise available to
the moving party.
S. 2760 § 201(e).
Failure to respond to a settlement offer within the applicable period constitutes a rejec-
tion. Id. § 201(0.
I Id. § 202. The parties may, however, "agree to be bound by determinations
made pursuant to any voluntary alternative dispute resolution procedures." Id. §
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The Act employs both incentives and punitive measures to en-
courage parties to utilize these expedited procedures. If a defendant re-
jects a settlement offer and if a verdict equal to or greater than the
value of the offer is subsequently entered against the defendant, the
defendant then becomes liable for the claimant's reasonable attorney's
fees and costs."6 Similarly, if the plaintiff rejects the defendant's offer
and the defendant is found liable, the defendant's liability shall be
capped at: (1) claimant's net economic loss for claimant's economic loss,
(2) $250,000 for non-economic losses in cases of dignitary loss, and (3)
the lesser of twice the claimant's economic loss or $50,000 where digni-
tary loss is not appropriate.87 Punitive damages, however, are not
capped."8
Title II mandates that under such expedited settlements "net eco-
nomic loss shall be paid periodically as costs are incurred."8 9 Finally,
201(g). "The Committee considers such alternative dispute resolution procedures to be
an appropriate means of dealing with such disagreements." S. REP. 2760, supra note 9,
at 34. Subsection (b) of section 202 bars other parties from attempting to recover - by
contribution, reimbursement, subrogation, or indemnification - from the settling de-
fendant for the same harm to the claimant.
86 S. 2760 § 203. The "reasonable attorney's fees and costs" for which the defend-
ant is liable shall "not exceed $100,000 . . .and shall be offset against, but shall not
exceedf] any fees owned [sic] by the claimant to the claimant's attorney by reason of the
verdict." Id. § 203(a). Attorney's fees are to be calculated on an hourly rate basis that
is "considered acceptable in the community in which the attorney practices, considering
the attorney's qualifications and experience and the complexity of the case." Id. §
203(c). The court, however, is given the power to reduce the amount of the claimant's
attorney's fees and costs for which the defendant is liable "if the court determines that
the defendant had a reasonable basis for rejecting the offer of settlement . . . because
the case involved a novel question of law or complex questions of fact." Id. § 203(b).
87 Id. § 204. The cap on non-economic awards is probably the most controversial
aspect of the bill. See Bill Gets Wide Support, supra note 71, at 681. The Committee
Report defends this provision:
[I]n many instances it is not possible to compensate someone fully for the
pain and anguish that has been suffered and continues to be suffered be-
cause of devastating injury or the loss of a family member[;] ...the
Committee does take note of the fact that non-economic awards for pain
and suffering are inherently subjective and unpredictable[;] . . . that non-
economic damages can obstruct the settlement process[;J. . .[and that] the
tort system grossly overpays those with the smallest losses, while un-
dercompensating those with the most serious losses.
S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 40.
The Committee Report further argues that "without the $250,000 cap there would not
be sufficient incentive for a defendant to make a title II settlement offer." Id. at 41.
S. 2760 §§ 204, 303.
sO Id. § 205(a). Subsection (b)(1) authorizes discharge of this obligation by a
lump-sum payment, subject to a court determination that the settlement is fair, when-
ever the estimated value of the net economic loss is greater than or equal to $10,000.
Subsection (b)(2) permits modification of the settlement agreement in instances of "a
material and substantial change of circumstances" or of "newly discovered evidence
concerning the claimant's physical condition, loss, or rehabilitation." Subsection (c) bars
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reimbursement rules for parties to a Title II settlement are
established. 90
Title III of the Act establishes a federal product liability law.91 To
the claimant from receiving payment for any additional economic losses with respect to
such hatm "[i]f a period of five years has elapsed after the most recent claim for pay-
ment is made with respect to the harm at issue."
90 Id. § 206.
By way of comparison, S. 1999 would have created an expedited product liability
claims procedure. Under this procedure, a person harmed by a product could submit a
claim. This claim procedure would have been exclusive, i.e., a claimant could not si-
multaneously pursue this procedure and a lawsuit. The manufacturer's liability would
have been limited to the "claimant's net economic loss resulting from such harm." S.
1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Under § 205, the manufacturer would be liable if:
(1) the product, when it left the control of the manufacturer, was unrea-
sonably dangerous; and (2) the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the
product was the proximate cause of the claimant's harm while the product
was being used in a manner and for a purpose intended by the manufac-
turer or which could be reasonably anticipated by the manufacturer....
Id. § 205.
Upon receipt of a claim, the manufacturer would have had 90 days in which to ac-
knowledge or dispute its liability. If the manufacturer did not contest liability, it had (i)
to pay the claimant the amount claimed, (ii) to pay the claimant a "mutually accept-
able" amount, or (iii) to pay the uncontested amount and notify the claimant of the
procedure for contesting the disputed sum.
Under S. 1999, if the claimant was not paid in full and wished to pursue the full
claim, the claimant had to initiate binding arbitration within 90 days. This procedure
represented the claimant's exclusive remedy in cases in which the only dispute con-
cerned the amount of the claimant's net economic loss. The Act established guidelines
designed to make the proceedings "expeditious, informal, and reasonably inexpensive in
cost." Id. § 207(b)(1). This arbitration was enforceable in court and only reviewable by
a court if there were allegations of "fraud, misrepresentation, or similar misconduct by
one of the parties . . . or the arbitrator." Id. § 207(b)(2). The manufacturer would be
liable for reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the arbitration if the
claimant were the "substantially prevailing party." Id. § 207(c). The manufacturer had
to pay the fee and expenses of the arbitrator unless the manufacturer was the "substan-
tially prevailing party," in which case the manfacturer "shall be entitled to recover
from the claimant all such sums paid to the arbitrator." Id. § 207(e).
In cases where the manufacturer denied liability, S. 1999 would have established a
different system than S. 2760. The claimant could bring a civil action limited "to [the
issues] raised by the claimant and set forth in such notice." Id. § 208(a). The issues
were to be tried by the court, i.e., without a jury, and expedited in every way. Id. Such
claims could be brought in state court in the state in which the harm occurred or in
which the claimant resides or in federal court pursuant to diversity. To have the court
enter an order directing arbitration to determine the amount of the net economic loss
and awarding attorneys' fees, the claimant had to establish only "by a preponderance of
the evidence" that the manufacturer failed to respond to his claim as required or that
the manufacturer was liable under the standards set forth in Section 205. Id. § 208(d).
'" These provisions in S. 2760 are very similar to those contained in S. 1999,
which in turn are very similar to those in S. 100 and S. 44, except that S. 2760 does
not include standards for manufacturer liability. Under S. 1999, to recover against a
manufacturer, a claimant must prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" that the
product was the proximate cause of the harm and either that (1) the manufacturer was
negligent in constructing the product, in designing or formulating the product, or in
providing warnings or instructions; or that (2) the product did not conform to an ex-
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further the objective of improving the efficiency of the system, 2 the Act
restricts seller liability to instances in which (1) the seller fails to exer-
cise reasonable care, (2) the product fails to conform to an express war-
ranty made by the seller, or (3) the manufacturer is not subject to ser-
vice or the claimant could not enforce a judgment against the
manufacturer.93 In all other cases, the claimant's sole recourse is
against the manufacturer.9 The Act does not establish uniform stan-
dards for manufacturer's liability, leaving claims against manufacturers
governed by state law.
9 5
The Act establishes uniform standards9" for awarding punitive
damages.97 These new strict standards combine a "high standard of
press warranty. However, the manufacturer of a product that complies with all "stan-
dards, conditions, or specifications" established by Congress or a federal agency is not
considered to have been negligent unless the claimant establishes that "a person exercis-
ing reasonable care could and would have taken additional precautions." S. 1999 § 302.
* S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 46.
93 S. 2760 § 302.
" The rationale for this approach is that product sellers are often sued in cases
where the manufacturer is ultimately responsible. In such cases, sellers are forced to
defend the suits and to seek indemnity from the manufacturers. Sellers are generally
successful in shifting the costs to the manufacturers. S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 46
(sellers account for less than five percent of product liability payments). However, sig-
nificant transaction costs are involved. The further argument that "indemnity does not
reimburse product sellers for loss of good will or reputation" (Id.) is of little relevance:
the product seller loses good will when the customer is harmed, not when a jury im-
poses liability.The standard of proof against product sellers other than manufacturers
mandated by S. 2760 is "a preponderance of the evidence." S. 2760 § 302. This phrase
is defined as "that measure or degree of proof which, by the weight, credit, and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side, establishes that it is more probable than not that
a fact occurred or did not occur." Id. § 102(a)(14). "This standard of proof is that used
most often in civil litigation." S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 26.
911 The extent of manufacturers' liability was not an isolated issue. Rather, this
issue was tied to proposed limitations on claimants' recoveries. See Product Liability
Act Amendments, supra note 10, at 12-16 (statement of Sen. Gorton). The compromise
reached by the Committee was to maintain the current system of having product liabil-
ity suits against manufacturers governed by state law. S. 2760 § 301. The bill's provi-
sions dealing with issues such as admissibility of evidence and punitive damages do,
however, apply to such suits. Id. §§ 303, 310.
" At present, the general standard for awarding punitive damages is that the de-
fendant must have acted with aggravation, outrage, or willfulness. See W. KEETON,
supra note 21, at 9-10.
9 S. 2760 § 303. Punitive damages may be awarded when the claimant estab-
lishes that the harm was "the result of conduct manifesting a manufacturer's or product
seller's conscious, flagrant indifference to the safety of those persons who might be
harmed by a product. A failure to exercise reasonable care in choosing among alterna-
tive product designs, formulations, instructions or warnings is not of itself such con-
duct." Id. § 303(a). Manufacturers and sellers of aircraft, drugs, and medical devices,
whose products have been certified or approved by the Federal Aviation Administration
or the Food and Drug Administration, respectively, are not, however, subject to puni-
tive damages unless the manufacturer withheld or misrepresented material information.
Id. § 303(c). For a discussion of punitive damage awards against aircraft manufactur-
ers, see Allen, Controlling the Growth of Punitive Damages in Products Liability
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culpability . . .far in excess of mere negligence, or even gross negli-
gence,"98 and a greater level of proof.99 This combination is designed to
"ensure that punitive damages are assessed only where appropriate
... [and only when] the defendant's conduct was truly reprehensi-
ble."'100 In addition to addressing concerns about the rationale for and
the increase in punitive damage awards,101 these stricter standards are
designed to encourage settlements 02 by decreasing the number of puni-
tive damage claims, claims which tend to discourage settlements because
they provide the claimant with the possibility of being granted a major
award.103 The Act does not specify any criteria to be used in determin-
ing the amount of punitive damages to be awarded.'
Cases, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 567, 579-82 (1986).
91 S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 50.
9s S. 2760 § 303(a). The level of proof required to justify assessing punitive dam-
ages is "clear and convincing evidence." The phrase "clear and convincing evidence" is
defined as:
that measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought
to be established; the level of proof required to satisfy such standard is
more than that required under preponderance of the evidence, but less
than that required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. § 102(a)(2).
Given the punitive nature of these awards (see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
908 (1977)), the Committee chose to increase the standard of proof to conform to their
"quasi-criminal" nature. S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 49. Both Minnesota and Ore-
gon have adopted the "clear and convincing evidence" test by statute. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.925(1) (1980). Wisconsin has
adopted this standard through case law. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.2d 260,
294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). Colorado requires that punitive damages be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1973).
100 S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 51, 50; see also Owen, supra note 11, at 38
("A plaintiff usually should be entitled to a directed verdict on defectiveness, or close
thereto, before the punitive damages issue is properly before the jury at all.").
101 See supra note 11; see also Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming
Punitive Damage Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983) (analyzing the constitution-
ality of prevailing punitive damages procedures).
101 S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 49.
1 Twerski, supra note 11, at 612 ("It is close to impossible to negotiate sensibly
with a plaintiff who believes that he can shoot for the moon.").
104 In previous measures considered by the Committee, such criteria were pro-
vided. In S. 1999, these criteria included:
(1) all relevant evidence relating to the factors [to be considered in deter-
mining whether to award punitive damages];
(2) the profitability of the conduct to the manufacturer. . .; and
(3) the total effect of other punishment imposed upon the manufacturer..
. as a result of misconduct, including punitive damage awards to persons
similarly situated to the claimant and the severity of other penalties to
which the manufacturer ... has been or may be subjected.
S. 1999 § 305(b).
The third factor illustrates a major difference between S. 44 and S. 100. Under S.
44, a manufacturer could only be subjected to one award of punitive damages. S. 44,
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To further the objective of creating uniform standards in product
liability cases, Title III codifies rules pertaining to the offsetting of
workers' compensation benefits'0° and the admissibility of evidence."0 8
In addition, the bill creates a complete defense for actions in which the
claimant was under the influence of alcohol or any drug;0 7 establishes
a two-year statute of limitations and a twenty-five-year statute of re-
98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1983). In S. 100, however, previous awards were merely to
be considered in determining the size of a subsequent punitive award. S. 100, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1985). In S. 2760, this provision was deleted, and no reference is
made at all to previous awards.
105 S. 2760 § 307:
In any civil action subject to this title in which damages are sought for
harm for which the person injured is or would have been entitled to re-
ceive compensation under any State or Federal workers' compensation
law, any damages awarded shall be reduced by the sum of the amount
paid as workers' compensation benefits for such harm and the present
value of all workers' compensation benefits to which the employee is or
would be entitled for such harm.
Id. § 307(a).
The employer's subrogation lien is eliminated in section 307(c). This measure is
designed to "clarif[y] the relationship between the workers' compensation system and
the product liability system with rules that keep these systems separate, minimize legal
costs, and promote safety." S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 64.
1o S. 2760 § 310. The most significant provision in this section is the prohibition
on the admissibility to prove liability of "[evidence] of measures taken after an event,
which if taken previously would have made the event less likely to occur . . . ." Id. §
310(b).
107 Id. § 311:
(a) In any civil action subject to this Act in which all defendants are man-
ufacturers or product sellers, a manufacturer or product seller may assert
in complete defense of such action that the claimant was under the influ-
ence of intoxicating alcohol or any drug and that such condition was more
than 50 per centum responsible for such claimant's harm.
(b) In any civil action subject to this Act in which not all defendants are
manufacturers or product sellers and the trier of fact determines that no
liability exists against those defendants who are not manufacturers or
product sellers, the court shall enter a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict in favor of any defendant which is a manufacturer or product seller if
it is proved that the claimant was under the influence of intoxicating alco-
hol or any drug and that such condition was more than 50 per centum
responsible for such claimant's harm.
(c)(1) For purposes of this section, the determination of whether a person
was under the influence of intoxicating alcohol shall be made pursuant to
applicable State law.
(2) As used in this section, the term "drug" means any non-over-the-
counter drug which has not been prescribed by a physician for use by the
claimant.
This section follows recent tort legislation enacted in Washington. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 5.40.060 (1987). The very strong public policy underlying this rule "justifies
preemption of conflicting state laws." S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 78. "A person
who impairs his or her ability to act safely should not be able to shift the cost of such
risks on the manufacturer or seller ... and ultimately onto society itself." Id. at 77.
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pose;"' and eliminates joint and several liability for non-economic
damages." 9
Title IV of the Act requires the Secretary of Commerce to report
to Congress annually on the impact of this Act on insurers."
3.3. Analysis of the Product Liability Reform Act
The stated purpose of the Product Liability Reform Act is to "re-
duce transactions costs and provide greater certainty as to the rights
and responsibilities of all those involved in product liability dis-
108 S. 2760 § 304. The two-year statute of limitations runs from when "the claim-
ant discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the harm
and its cause." Id. § 304(a). The statute of repose establishes the period during which
the manufacturer or product seller remains responsible for harms caused by the product
it produced or sold. The 25-year period applies to cases in which the product is a
capital good; toxic harms, however, are specifically excluded from this limitation. Id. §
304(b)(1). For non-capital goods, section 304(b)(2)(A) limits manufacturer and seller
responsibility to the period of the "product's useful safe life" instead of establishing a
definitive statute of repose. A rebuttable presumption is established that this period
ends 10 years after delivery of the product. "Such presumption may be rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence." Id. § 304(b)(2)(C). "A product has exceeded its useful
safe life if . . .it is no longer reasonable to expect that the product would operate
without malfunction or increased risk of harm." S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 59.
Motor vehicles, vessels, aircraft, or railroads "used primarily to transport passengers
for hire" are excluded from these provisions. S. 2760 § 304(b)(3).
109 S. 2760 § 308:
(a) In any product liability action, the liability of each defendant for
noneconomic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each
defendant shall be liable only for the amount of noneconomic damages
allocated to such defendant in direct proportion to such defendant's per-
centage of responsibility ....
(b) For purposes of this section, the trier of fact shall determine the pro-
portion of responsibility of each party for the claimant's harm.
(c) As used in this section, the term-
(1) "noneconomic damages" means subjective, nonmonetary losses
including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss
of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation; the term does
not include objectively verifiable monetary losses ....
This section is based on Proposition 51, which California voters approved on June 3,
1986; the law took effect immediately. S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 69 & n.224.
"This section is a compromise. It . . .limit[s] the application of joint and several liabil-
ity to situations where it is defensible on public policy grounds-where a person's eco-
nomic loss would otherwise be uncompensated. This distinction between economic and
non-economic loss is consistent with the underlying policy of joint and several liability
to make the injured party whole." Id. at 68.
Title III also provides standards regarding counsel's liability for excessive costs (§
305-imposing sanctions similar to those available under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure), record retention (§ 306), and forum non conveniens (§ 309 -
reflecting existing law).
110 S. 2760 § 401.
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putes." 1" When measured by its own objectives, S. 2760 fails because
it does not provide the comprehensive reform"1 2 that would correct the
various shortcomings of the present system. 1 Rather, S. 2760 encom-
passes a series of compromises.1 4 addressing isolated aspects of the
product liability system. Such a hodgepodge of reforms would not "re-
duce transactions costs and provide greater certainty." Indeed, it is
quite possible that enactment of S. 2760 would instead aggravate the
present situation by creating new problems. Therefore, the Product Li-
ability Reform Act should be rejected, and efforts should be renewed in
the 100th Congress to draft and adopt a comprehensive federal re-
form 15 of the product liability system in the United States.
116
One glaring shortcoming of the Product Liability Reform Act is its
failure to establish uniform standards for manufacturer liability.117 The
failure of the Committee to draft such standards1 8 is not an insignifi-
I'l S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 2.
... For example, S. 2760 fails to provide standards for manufacturer liability (see
supra note 95 and accompanying text); to establish criteria for determining the amount
of punitive damages (see supra note 104 and accompanying text); or even to address
other product liability issues such as the extent of a manufacturer's duty to warn (see
supra note 38), the definition of what constitutes a defect (see supra note 37), or the
propriety of new theories of liability, including the market-share doctrine (see supra
notes 39-44 and accompanying text).
11 See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
114 See, e.g., supra note 95. The Product Liability Reform Act was favorably rec-
ommended by the Committee by a vote of 10 to 7. However, several senators who voted
to recommend the measure to the full Senate voiced serious reservations about provi-
sions contained in the bill. See S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 99-100 (Additional
Views of Mr. Rockefeller) (expressing dissatisfaction with imposing caps on pain and
suffering recoveries at $250,000). One senator who voted to recommend the bill specifi-
cally noted his intent to introduce amendments on the Senate floor. See id. at 96-97
(Additional Views of Mr. Pressler) (noting his belief that stronger joint and several
liability provisions than contained in section 308 are needed).
115 See, e.g., S. 44; S. 1999.
116 The general concept of a federal product liability statute will not be addressed
in this comment because this issue has already received considerable coverage in the law
review literature. See, e.g., Elfin, supra note 39; Reed & Watkins, supra note 5;
Schwartz & Bares, supra note 4; Comment, The Proposed Federal Product Liability
Act: The Substantive Impact of S. 100 on Establishing a Cause of Action for Product-
Caused Injury in Illinois, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 659 (1985); see also Cohen,
Legal Analysis of the 'Product Liability Act' (S. 100, 99th Congress) as Introduced,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS No. 85-587A (Feb. 12,
1985).
117 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. Now that the intense political pres-
sure for product liability reform has slackened (see Hilder, supra note 74; Strasser,
supra note 74), Congress can address this issue with a greater degree of objectivity and
long-range perspective.
118 Provision Rejected, supra note 67. The amendment proposed by Sen. Kasten
would establish the following standards: strict liability would be the applicable stan-
dard in manufacturing defect and express warranty cases; proof of negligence would be
required to impose liability in claims involving design defect and warnings; and de-
fenses based on obvious or known dangers, misuse or alteration, and state-of-the-art
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cant oversight, given that manufacturers currently bear ninety-five per-
cent of product liability payments.119 By not addressing this issue, S.
2760 leaves manufacturer standards under the jurisdiction of state
law'20 and therefore perpetuates the consequent variety of doctrines
and judicial interpretations.
The Act also leaves unresolved the problem of conflicting stan-
dards in areas of product liability law such as a manufacturer's duty to
warn and the definition of design defect. 1 Preserving the status quo in
this area of the law fails to provide the certainty that is the goal of this
legislation. Episodes in which claimants (or manufacturers), who are
identical in all respects except the state in which their lawsuits are
filed, receive very different verdicts will continue under this proposed
regime.
1
22
Similarly, the Product Liability Reform Act does not settle the
conflicts that rage regarding evolving doctrines of law, such as deter-
mining under which, if any, theories the manufacturers of harmful ge-
neric products can be held liable. Once again, this lack of uniformity
adversely affects manufacturers who are unable to anticipate their lia-
bility costs. Furthermore, the Act fails to alleviate the apparent injustice
of very disparate treatment by various state courts of claimants who file
suit in different states but who are injured by products that are pro-
duced and distributed nationally.
The Product Liability Reform Act would, however, affect manu-
facturers through its other provisions, such as those affecting joint and
several liability, punitive damages, and admissibility of evidence. The
overall impact of these interrelated new standards on the myriad of
existing state laws is hard to predict. This uncertainty clearly runs
against the intent of the Act. Similarly, passage of a federal bill lacking
manufacturer standards could increase the uncertainty inherent in the
system as parties affected by product liability laws anticipate future
technology would be recognized. This amendment was rejected by a vote of 10 to 6. S.
REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 84.
119 INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, supra note 9, at 35.
120 An amendment offered by Sen. Kasten to apply a "reasonable person" negli-
gence standard in cases involving design defects and warnings was defeated by the
Committee during its markup session. Provision Rejected, supra, note 67. For a discus-
sion of the conflicting standards currently utilized by various state courts, see supra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
"'1 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the manner in
which the tort laws and limits on recovery of various states could produce widely diver-
gent awards for plaintiffs similarly situated in all respects except the state in which
they can file their lawsuits with regard to a particular episode in which many individu-
als were hurt or killed (though not in a product liability context), see Coyle, 'Finger-
Pointing' Likely Between Two Rail Systems, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19, 1987, at 3, col. 3.
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congressional action that would correct this omission. Reform geared at
"provid[ing] greater certainty as to rights and responsibilities of all
those involved in product liability disputes" must contain uniform man-
ufacturer standards. Manufacturer's standards constitute an essential
aspect of any federal product liability bill.
An objective of Title II of the Product Liability Reform Act is to
provide "[v]ictims of product-related injuries . . . a fairer level of com-
pensation .. ".. ,12s In practice, however, the Title II provisions of S.
2760 would conflict with the stated objective. In particular, the caps on
non-economic losses that apply if a defendant offers to settle124 would
limit the recovery of those most seriously harmed, those who currently
are already undercompensated 25
The fairness of imposing such caps received considerable attention
during the Committee debates.1 26 The poignant statement by Sen. In-
ouye summarized the fairness argument:
A woman who used the Dalkon Shield has almost no eco-
nomic loss, but how can you tell her that the $150,000 is
sufficient compensation if she cannot give birth to any child
as a result of the Shield. I do not know how much it is
worth, but I can tell you it is worth more than $150,000.
Then what do you tell a quadriplegic who is unable to
sleep with his lady, who is unable to play ball with his son?
$150,000 is enough?
What do you do? What price tag do you put on that?
This much I know: $150,000 is not enough. 27
Because a ceiling would be placed on their liability, manufacturers
123 S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 31.
124 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. These caps are designed to provide
the incentives necessary to induce defendants to compensate severely impaired claimants
promptly. Furthermore, the caps would apply only if the defendant compensates the
claimant for all the economic losses suffered by claimant, a result not achieved by the
current product liability system. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. Provid-
ing the proper incentives to induce defendants to settle promptly is one of the major
problems faced in formulating an effective product liability reform measure. See infra
notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 98-124 (Additional Views of Mr.
Stevens, Additional Views of Mr. Rockefeller, Minority Views of Mr. Gorton, Minor-
ity Views of Mr. Inouye, Minority Views of Mr. Gore); see also Bill Approved, supra
note 67. Several states, however, including Florida, have instituted such caps. Wayne,
Florida Insurers Assail Premium Rollback Bill, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1986, at D2,
col. 1; see Barron, supra note 1; Kristof, supra note 1.
127 Sen. Inouye, testimony at markup session, transcript pp. 206-07.
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and product sellers would have the largest incentives to settle the most
egregious cases.1 28 This would further limit the compensation that the
most severely harmed would receive, an especially perverse result in
light of the fact that this group is already undercompensated 1 29 Thus,
the caps imposed by S. 2760 do not further the objectives of a rational,
comprehensive product liability reform measure.
The inadequate handling of punitive damages in the Product Lia-
bility Reform Act also prevents the Act from meeting its objectives of
providing greater certainty and reducing transaction costs. Although the
Act does begin to remedy the current situation'"0 by establishing uni-
form standards for imposing punitive damages - that in many cases
toughen the requirements for granting such awards1 3 -the Act neither
provides the necessary certainty nor minimizes transaction costs.
The existing rules regarding punitive damage awards impede the
settlement of cases.132 Although the standards contained in S. 2760
would help to alleviate the present problems, these measures do not go
far enough. Under these new provisions, claimants and manufacturers
would be given little guidance in settling punitive damage claims be-
cause no uniform standards for determining the size of such awards
would be established. Limiting the number of punitive damage awards
that could be imposed on a manufacturer for each defective product, as
was done in S. 44, might not provide the necessary incentives in terms
of deterrence or punishment. Furthermore, such a proposal might not
-create sufficient incentives for lawyers to handle cases because an initial
small award, or several small awards, might preclude further
awards.1"' However, a provision requiring the trier of fact to consider
past public fines and punitive damage awards in determining the size of
the punitive damage award would strike the appropriate balance.
Damage awards would not be capped so that the deterrence, punish-
ment, and incentive aspects would be achieved because significant dam-
age awards could still be meted out in appropriate circumstances. In
addition, a greater degree of certainty would prevail because of the
known standards, thereby presenting both plaintiffs and defendants bet-
ter and more relevant information on which to base settlement
negotiations.
Thus, various provisions in S. 2760 contradict the objectives of the
128 S. REP. 2760, supra note 9, at 101 (Minority Views of Mr. Gorton).
129 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
131 But see S. REP. 476, supra note 57, at 55-72.
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Act. Instead, a comprehensive federal product liability measure is
needed. Such reform should include an alternative claims procedure
that would be more equitable, would provide claimants with the option
of participating, and would establish uniform federal product liability
standards.
A voluntary alternative claims procedure, similar to the no-fault
system proposed in S. 1999, should be adopted by Congress in conjunc-
tion with comprehensive federal product liability standards.'" Such a
system would not change the incentives and deterrents inherent in the
present tort litigation framework, which are designed to ensure that
products entering the marketplace are as safe as feasible. In fact, such a
system would lead to the introduction of new products - products that
might otherwise be held off the market - because this system would
minimize uncertainty regarding potential product liability for new
products and thus would lower costs and consequently would raise ex-
pected profits for manufacturers. " 5
Claimants who were harmed by a product would be given the op-
tion, but would not be required, to seek the amount of their net eco-
nomic loss in an expedited manner from the manufacturer; alterna-
tively, they would be permitted to pursue their claims under the
provisions of the federal product liability act. The prospect of obtaining
the amount of the net economic loss in an expedited settlement - as
opposed to the average five years that it takes to receive payment under
the traditional system"'8 - without the trauma of protracted litigation
would lure some claimants3 7 to this alternative system. Manufacturers
would be encouraged to utilize this expedited system rather than to
contest liability through litigation because they would be provided the
opportunity to settle claims quickly for the amount of the plaintiff's net
economic loss. Under the expedited system, they thereby could relieve
themselves of the obligation to litigate the claim, litigation in which
they often spend more on legal fees than the amount of the net eco-
nomic loss of the plaintiff."
Tangible incentives would be needed to encourage defendants to
184 Alternative dispute resolution procedures, such as arbitration programs an-
nexed to state trial courts, have proven effective in other litigation contexts. Product
Liability Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 85 (statement of Hensler). This comment will
propose an alternative system but does not address the particular standards that a fed-
eral product liability bill should include.
185 Statement of Sen. Danforth, supra note 4, at S18,321.
188 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
137 See infra paragraph following note 144.
188 See supra note 6.
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utilize this alternative system. 39 Cases in which defendants reject set-
tlement offers would be handled under the federal uniform product lia-
bility standards; in these cases, however, the burden of persuasion
would shift to the defendant once the plaintiff established a prima facie
case. Furthermore, successful claimants would be entitled to recover
court costs and attorneys' fees.140 Such a system would not lower the
incentives and deterrents that help ensure that manufacturers produce
safe products, i.e., deterrence from producing unsafe goods. The fault
and punitive damages provisions in the federal product liability statute
would still impose deterrence.""
The crucial aspect of such a system would be the voluntary nature
139 O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury
Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw.
U.L. REv. 589, 602 (1982).
140 Id. at 602-04. The proposed system provides incentives for parties to settle
claims but does not compel settlement. Cf id. (granting the defendant the power to
compel the claimant to accept a settlement for net economic loss). Given the bias that
such a system would have toward manufacturers' seeking to settle only the most egre-
gious cases (see supra note 128 and accompanying text) and the concerns expressed
regarding the lowering the deterrents that help ensure that manufacturers produce safe
products (see infra note 141 and accompanying text), granting neither party the power
to force a settlement is preferable. Obviously, the key to such a system's functioning
effectively is creating incentives sufficient to induce both sides to settle claims for the
claimant's net economic loss.
141 Product Liability Act Amendments, supra note 10, at 10 (statement of Sen.
Dodd) (the expedited claims system would increase the deterrence aspect because the
"greater certainty of recovery in the claims system" would provide a greater effect than
the current system where larger rewards are possible but are unpredictable). Critics
contend that the current system does not shape defendants' behavior because "by the
time a product case is litigated the design of the product is likely to be so changed that
the case result is largely irrelevant." O'Connell, Products and Services: No Fault
Without Legislation, 62 A.B.A. J. 343, 344 (1976). Nor does no-fault undercut deter-
rence. No-fault automobile insurance statutes and the workers' compensation system
are generally cited in support of this proposition. Id. "[N]o one [has been] able to
demonstrate convincingly that no-fault undercuts deterrence. . . . As long as we inter-
nalize substantial amounts of economic loss generated by economic activity, we achieve
whatever deterrence we are going to achieve." Product Liability Act Amendments,
supra note 10, at 65 (statement of Prof. O'Connell); see also id. at 83-89 (statement of
Prof. Priest).
The neutral or even positive effect of the no-fault provisions on defendants' con-
duct has, however, been questioned. See, e.g., Reutter, The Shame of Workmen's Com-
pensation, 230 THE NATION 298 (1980). One commentator contends that workers'
compensation systems "[allow] industry to monetize human pain and suffering and
translate that cost into passed on insurance premiums." Product Liability Act Amend-
ments, supra note 10, at 95 (statement of Prof. Popper). Thus, the incentive for claim-
ants to opt for a quick settlement will lead to lower settlements and less incentive for
manufacturers to be concerned about the safety of their products. Id. at 91. Another
view is that, although the threat of numerous claims might provide responsible manu-
facturers with sufficient incentives to produce safe products, "the marginal, fly-by-night
manufacturer might be encouraged by the absence of restraints against irresponsible
[conduct]" not to take necessary precautions. Ford, The Fault with "No Fault", 61
A.B.A. J. 1071, 1072 (1975).
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of its provisions; 142 each claimant would have the option of relying on
the traditional tort litigation system or of utilizing this new procedure.
By providing an option that a significant number of claimants' 4 would
consider preferable, such a system would constitute important
reform.'4
The voluntary nature of the expedited claim system would amelio-
142 The debate concerning the efficacy of a no-fault system in a product liability
context has been raging in the law review literature for a decade. Since the 1960s, Prof,
O'Connell has advocated a no-fault system for automobiles. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL,
THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE (1971);
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH: THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND
INSURANCE REFORM (1967). In 1975, Prof. O'Connell advocated such a system in the
product liability context. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT IN-
SURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975). During the two years 1975 and 1976,
Prof. O'Connell published numerous law review articles on this subject. See, e.g.,
O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance
for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976); O'Connell, Elective No-
Fault Liability By Contract - With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F.
59; O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for All Accidents, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 461
(1975).
Prof. O'Connell's ideas have sparked a variety of reviews. Some commentators
responded with scathing criticism of his work. See, e.g., Corboy, The Expanding Uni-
verse of Jeffrey O'Connell: Backing into a Brave New World, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 74;
Ford, supra note 141. Others felt that Prof. O'Connell had raised some interesting
ideas but that his recommendations had some major shortcomings. See, e.g., Keeton,
Book Review, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 429 (1976) (reviewing J. O'CONNELL, ENDING
INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975)).
And some responded favorably to his ideas. See, e.g., Schwartz, Products Liability and
No-Fault Insurance: Can One Live Without the Other?, 12 FORUM 130 (1976).
In 1983, Prof. O'Connell, recognizing "the difficulties of extending pure no-fault
principles to nonindustrial and nonauto accidents. . . [and] the practical, political, and
theoretical problems of totally abolishing personal injury tort law and moving to across-
the-board no-fault payment," proposed "as a partial solution, a means of allowing de-
fendants to foreclose personal injury claims by promptly tendering claimants' net eco-
nomic loss . . . beyond claimants' own collateral sources of insurance." O'Connell,
supra note 139, at 631, 590. Prof. O'Connell has been a major supporter of federal
product liability reform. Although he did not endorse S. 1999 at the hearings on that
bill, Prof. O'Connell testified, "We ought to make it easier. . . for injured people to be
paid promptly for their economic loss . . . without litigating their own or others' fault
." Product Liability Act Hearings, supra note 8, at 77 (statement of Prof.
O'Connell).
143 Although it is hard to predict the number or percentage of potential plaintiffs
who would forego litigation in order to rely on the expedited claim system, one com-
mentator estimated that 25% would utilize the alternative system contained in S. 1999.
Product Liability Act Amendments, supra note 10, at 80 (statement of Prof. Keeton). It
could be argued, as Prof. Keeton does, that this is only a small number of claimants
and thus not a significant change from the status quo. Id. However, the reverse argu-
ment can also be made, i.e., that providing an alternative to 25% of the claimants con-
stitutes a major reform.
144 The provisions requiring lawyers to disclose to clients their various options
and the probable consequences of each would help to ensure that claimants would be
making informed decisions when they select the avenue by which to pursue their
claims. See, e.g., S. 1999 § 105; see also supra note 79.
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rate any negative consequences that might arise with regard to the de-
terrence and incentive aspects of the tort system. Incentives would still
exist for plaintiffs (and lawyers) to litigate cases that potentially could
produce large verdicts (and the consequential large fees for the attor-
neys involved). Such a system would insure that not all claims are set-
tled merely for the claimant's net economic loss and that companies
would still have to be wary of the possibility of being assessed large
damage awards (including punitive awards) if they produce unsafe
products.
Another benefit resulting from such a system would be the allevia-
tion of some of the burden on the court systems. " 5 Relieving the courts
of a quarter of the product liability cases, as one scholar estimated,""
would represent a significant improvement. Gases in which the manu-
facturer denies liability and the claimant brings a civil action pursuant
to the federal statute147 would continue to reside in state courts. Such
cases would not be shifted to the federal courts because federal jurisdic-
tion would not be created under a federal statutory cause of action but
would only be possible under diversity of citizenship.
1 "
The combination of a federal product liability statute establishing
comprehensive uniform standards and a voluntary alternative claims
provision would bring about badly needed reform of the product liabil-
ity system currently existing in the United States. The 100th Congress
should adopt such legislation.' 9
4. PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Product liability laws in numerous countries besides the United
"" In 1983, 9,221 product liability actions were filed in federal district courts, and
it is estimated that 45,000 to 90,000 are filed each year in state courts. Letter from
Leland Beck, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Sen. Robert Kasten
(Dec. 7, 1983), cited in Schwartz & Bares, supra note 4, at 359 n.37.
148 See supra note 143.
147 See, e.g., S. 1999 § 208.
148 See, e.g., S. 2760 § 104; S. 1999 § 208(b); see also supra notes 77-78 and
accompanying text. I would further argue that this may well be giving the already
overburdened federal courts too great an involvement. Relieving the federal courts of
jurisdiction in diversity cases would further alleviate this problem, but such a solution
may be politically infeasible and is beyond the scope of a product liability reform bill.
149 The fact that the Democratic Party regained control of the Senate during the
100th Congress dims the chances of the Senate's passing a federal product liability
measure. Senator Hollings, "an adamant opponent" of such a measure, will become the
new chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the
Committee that acted favorably on previous product liability bills. "The outlook, even
with a Republican Senate, was difficult. Now it's even more remote . . . ." Adminis-
tration Faces New Judiciary Committee, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 5, 7 (quoting
James Gattuso); see also Fuerbringer, Hollings Has Plans for Commerce, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 18, 1986, at A29, col. 4.
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States are being subjected to pressures for change.150 For example, in
July 1985, the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Com-
munity adopted a Directive on Liability for Defective Products. 
51
Other examples of legislation affecting product liability include West
Germany's imposition of stricter liability on pharmaceutical manufac-
turers15' and New Zealand's no-fault compensation system.15' Focusing
on Europe, one commentator noted that "across Europe [there are] un-
mistakable moves towards stricter liability, but overall [there is] a range
of solutions as varied as the countries themselves ....
"'0 "[Plroduct liability has gained increasing attention in all industrial countries."
Ottley & Ottley, Product Liability Law in Japan: An Introduction to a Developing
Area of Law, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 29, 29 (1984). See generally II PRODUCT
LIABILITY: A MANUAL OF PRACTICE IN SELECTED NATIONS (H. Stucki & P. Al-
tenburger eds. 1981) [hereinafter II PRODUCTS LIABILITY] (discussing product liability
in eight European countries); Hollenshead & Conway, An Overview: International
Products Liability, TRIAL, Nov. 1980, at 50.
151 Council Directive No. 374 of July 25, 1985 on the Approximation of the
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning
Liability for Defective Products, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) (1985). For a dis-
cussion of this Directive, see infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
152 Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Arzneimittelrechtes (Revised Pharmaceutical
Law), Aug. 24, 1976, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI.I] 2445 (W. Ger.), cited in Or-
ban, Products Liability: A Comparative Legal Restatement - Foreign National Law
and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 342, 343 n.5 (1978); see also
Hollenshead & Conway, supra note 150, at 53 (providing a comparative analysis of
West German and other nations' product liability laws).
153 Accident Compensation Act of 1972, 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409 (1975), cited in Hen-
derson, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 781
(1981); see also Sugarman, supra note 12, at 632-35 (discussing New Zealand tort law
reform). For a discussion of these and other international developments, -see Hol-
lenshead & Conway, supra note 150; II PRODUCTS. LIABILITY, supra note 150.
A different situation prevails in Japan. Product liability laws in Japan are being
subjected to pressure from Japan's trading partners who feel that Japan's product lia-
bility system serves as a trade barrier. Cohen & Martin, Western Ideology, Japanese
Safety Regulation and International Trade, 19 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 315 (1985).
Despite these pressures, "[tihe most important factors that will determine the future of
this area of law in Japan are not found in the formal legal system but in the social
conditions which determine when and how that legal system is used. . . . [Slignificant
pressures to change the law have not yet developed." Ottley & Ottley, supra note 150,
at 31, 59.
The differences in the legal systems between common law countries, such as the
United Kingdom (where laws tend to evolve through judicial decisions with little, if
any, legislation on the subject), and civil law countries, such as West Germany (where
legal change tends to occur through legislation and the power of judges to change legal
doctrines is constrained), explain some of the differences between West Germany and
the United Kingdom. Differences in national outlook and the overall legal/historical/
cultural environments also are of great explanatory value. See generally notes 210-13
and accompanying text (discussing the lack of adoption of no-fault product liability
schemes by other countries).
154 Whincup, supra note 14, at 537; see Boger, The Harmonization of European
Products Liability Law, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 21 (1984).
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In the United Kingdom, 55 the phrase "product liability" is not
utilized; rather claims are based on the rubrics of "sale of goods" and
"negligence." '15 As these classifications indicate, English law distin-
guishes between claims based on contract and those based on tort.
1 57
Whether liability can be imposed in contract claims depends on the
terms of the contract that exists between the parties;158 however, to es-
tablish liability in tort claims, the plaintiff must show that the defend-
ant owed him a duty of care and that that duty was violated.159
In suits governed by the laws of contract, liability will be imposed
only when the terms of the contract between the parties are
breached.160 The doctrine of privity of contract, which makes the seller
or manufacturer liable only to the party with whom the direct contrac-
tual agreement exists, further limits the ability of people injured by a
product to recover.161 Although the doctrine of privity has not been al-
tered, "[riecent legislation has aided the consumer somewhat. '16 2 Sell-
ers are now prevented by the Sale of Goods (Implied Terms) Act of
197316s from excluding implied warranties, such as merchantable qual-
ity and fitness for a particular purpose, from consumer contracts. The
Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 further limits the contractual ex-
clusions on which merchants can insist.1 ' Similarly, buyers are permit-
155 The product liability system (and the legal system generally) in the United
Kingdom must be distinguished from its political system. Politically, England, Scotland,
.Wales, and Northern Ireland constitute the United Kingdom; the English legal system
operates only in England and Wales. See Boger, supra note 154, at 15. This comment
focuses on English law.
"' Boger, supra note 154, at 15.
15M Dodson, The United Kingdom, in II PRODUCTS LIABiLrrY, supra note 150.
115 Daniels v. R. White & Sons, Ltd., [1938] 4 All E.R. 258 (K.B.) (husband and
wife sued manufacturer and seller of lemonade that contained acid; the contract claim
against seller could only be pressed by the husband because he was the one who actu-
ally purchased the lemonade; lacking proof of negligence, the wife was left with no
remedy at law).
a Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] App.Cas. 562 (appellant suffered injury by
drinking ginger beer from a bottle that contained the remains of a snail; the House of
Lords held that the manufacturer owed a duty of care to persons likely to come in
contact with the product; in this particular case, however, the plaintiffs were unable to
prove negligence).
160 Dodson, supra note 157, at 6. "In contract, liability is strict. Although negli-
gence on the part of a party to a contract may be a breach of contract, negligence is not
the criterion on which liability is based; the question is whether or not the Defendant
kept his promise rather than whether he was negligent." Id. at 7.
161 Daniels, [1938] 4 All E.R. 258; see generally Orban, supra note 152, at 360-
61; Dodson, supra note 157, at 6-7 (both articles discuss limitations of contract law in
recovery).
16' Maddox, Products Liability in Europe: Towards a Regime of Strict Liability,
19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 508, 513 (1985).
163 Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act, 1973, ch. 13.
16" Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, ch. 50.
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ted to proceed under a theory of breach of implied warranty by the Sale
of Goods Act of 1979."'5 Although these reforms have helped plaintiffs,
English contract law still favors the seller over the consumer due to the
restrictive aspects of the privity doctrine.1 6
In suits governed by the laws of tort, the "duties imposed by law
must of their nature be less stringent than those imposed by con-
tract.11 17 The key issue in tort cases is the breach of a legal duty to
exercise reasonable care."' 8 In the seminal case of Donoghue v. Steven-
son, 6 9 the House of Lords held:
[A] manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form
as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate con-
sumer in the form in which they left him with no reasonable
possibility of intermediate examination, and with knowledge
that the absence of reasonable care in preparation or putting
up of the product will result in an injury to the consumer's
life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that
reasonable care.
17 0
Still, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing negligence, 17 and this
often becomes a difficult task.1
7 2
168 Sale of Goods Act, 1979, ch. 54, § 53.
1 Maddox, supra note 162, at 513.
187 Whincup, supra note 14, at 524 (paraphrasing Donoghue v. Stevenson).
168 "ITIhe duty owed to the consumer, or the ultimate purchaser, by the manufac-
turer is not to ensure that his goods are perfect. All he has to do is to take reasonable
care to see that no injury is done to the consumer or ultimate purchaser. In other
words, his duty is to take reasonable care to see that there exists no defect that is likely
to cause such injury." Daniels v. R. White & Sons, Ltd., [1938] 4 All E.R. 258, 261;
Lambert v. Lewis, [1980] 1 All E.R. 978 (C.A.), rev'd, [1981] 1 All E.R. 1185 (H.L.).
See Samuel, Responsibility for Injury Caused by a Defective Coupling, 132 NEw L.J.
833 (1982) (discussing the case of Lambert v. Lewis). "The tort of negligence has...
three inter-related elements; first, a legal duty on the part of the Defendant to exercise
care, secondly a breach of that duty, and thirdly, damage to the Plaintiff caused by the
breach of duty." Dodson, supra note 157, at 8.
119 [1932] App.Cas. 562.
170 Id. at 599.
171 See Orban, supra note 152, at 362; Boger, supra note 154, at 18.
172 Allen v. Distillers Co., [1974] 2 All E.R. 365 (all allegations of negligence
were withdrawn during settlement in thalidomide case); see Dodson, supra note 157, at
8; Orban, supra note 152, at 361. This task is further complicated by the fact that
establishing negligence depends on the relationship among five factors: the likelihood of
accident, its seriousness should it occur, the obviousness of the danger, the cost of
preventing the risk, and the risk inherent in the good. Whincup, supra note 14, at 524
(citing Morris v. Hartlepool Stean. Navigokin., [1956] 1 All E.R. 385 (H.L.)). No
definitive standards exist for weighing the various factors; "[iut is virtually impossible to
predict how a judge will assess or balance these factors one against the other in a
particular case." Id. Thus, the plaintiff's obligation to prove negligence "may be an
extremely difficult burden to discharge." Id.
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The courts, however, will at times infer negligence from the exis-
tence of defects.173 Thus, in the extreme case of Grant v. Australian
Knitting Mills,174 a plaintiff prevailed who alleged that he contracted
dermatitis from chemicals contained in undergarments; the manufac-
turer was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence even though
this was the first adverse reaction in over one million garments and the
plaintiff did not prove that the manufacturer was responsible for the
presence of chemicals in the garments. 75
Recovery under a tort claim is further hindered by the failure of
the English legal system to recognize the principle of strict liability.178
Despite the adoption of this principle by the House of Lords in Ry-
lands v. Fletcher'" (1868) in the context of unnatural use of land,
English courts have refused to apply this doctrine in the product liabil-
ity context.178
The differences between tort and contract actions extend to the
measure of damages that are recoverable. In contract claims, "full dam-
ages including pure economic loss, are recoverable" 7" whereas in tort
claims recovery is limited to the extent of "full forseeable damages to
person and property, medical [expenses], lost earnings, [an amount for]
pain and suffering, but economic loss normally [is permitted] only when
175 This general doctrine is referred to as res ipsa loquitor. "Once a plaintiff
demonstrates that a product was defective and caused him injury, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor acts to raise an inference from the circumstantial evidence that the manu-
facturer was negligent. The doctrine has been applied usually to benefit the consumer."
Maddox, supra note 162, at 513.
'" [1936] App. Cas. 85.
175 See Orban, supra note 152, at 361 (stating that Grant applies "[tihe rebutta-
ble presumption ... perhaps in its most liberal form"); Boger, supra note 154, at 19
(stating that Grant represents "the most liberal illustration of this principle"). But see
Daniels v. R. White & Sons, Ltd., [1938] 4 All E.R. 258, 260-61 (K.B.) In Daniels,
the court refused to utilize the presumption of negligence even though a bottle of lem-
onade contained carbolic acid: "It is not sufficient to say that carbolic acid is not found
in bottles of lemonade unless someone has blundered. The plaintiff must go further,
and must prove that the carbolic acid has got into the bottle because the defendant has
not taken reasonable care to keep it out." The Daniels court quoted approvingly from
Donoghue v. Stevenson: "There is no presumption of negligence in such a case as the
present, nor is there any justification for applying the maxim, res ipsa loquitor. Negli-
gence must be both averred and proved." Donoghue, 1932 App. Cas. at 622. However,
"The Daniels case . . . appears to be a distinct minority view." Maddox, supra note
162, at 514 (citing Plummer, Products Liability in Britain, 9 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 65,
69 (1980)).
171 See Orban, supra note 152, at 359; Dodson, supra note 157, at 8.
177 Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
175 Other European countries, including France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, have
adopted the rule of strict liability. Hollenshead & Conway, supra note 150, at 52. See
generally Maddox, supra note 162 (discussing product liability laws in Europe). In the
United States, strict liability is, of course, the accepted standard. See supra notes 25-28
and accompanying text.
17' Boger, supra note 154, at 20.
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there is physical damage."' 1 0
Damages under the English system are designed "to make good
financial loss only," and awards of punitive damages are unusual.1 81
This emphasis on compensation has tended to restrict the size of the
damage awards."8 ' In general, damage awards in England are consider-
ably smaller than those in the United States. 83 Damages are assessed
in a lump sum, and periodic payments are not permitted.'"
This static view of product liability ignores the domestic and inter-
national pressures on the English legal system and the trends within
the system. Both the Scottish and English Law Commissions have en-
dorsed the principles of strict liability. 85 Similarly, the Royal Commis-
sion on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury has rec-
ommended the adoption of the doctrine of strict liability.8 ' Since the
reports of these Commissions were published, however, "there has been
little change."
18' 7
The English system has also faced international pressure as a re-
sult of attempts to harmonize international product liability laws and to
reduce unfair trade competition. 88 The focus of these efforts in Europe
has been the European Economic Community Directive on Product Li-
ability, 89 which mandates the adoption of a strict liability standard.
o Orban, supra note 152, at 364.
181 Dodson, supra note 157, at 38.
182 See Orban, supra note 152, at 393 legislation (noting tendency of European
lawyers "to focus on 'compensation' as the sole purpose of product liability litigation").
lBS Orban, supra note 152, at 393 n.169 (as of 1978, the largest British personal
injury award was £ 132,970).
18 Dodson, supra note 157, at 38.
185 Liability for Defective Products, 1977, CMND. No. 6831, cited in Dodson,
supra note 157, at 5 n.3, 60 n.53 and accompanying text.
188 Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury
(Pearson Report), 1978, CMND. No. 7054, ch. 22, cited in Dodson, supra note 157, at
5 n.4 and accompanying text.
187 See Dodson, supra note 157, at 8.
18 Sheinman, The EEC Directive on Product Liability, 1985 J. Bus. L. 504, 505;
28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 29, 29 (1985).
189 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 29 (1985). Among the mandatory provi-
sions of this Directive are: strict liability for producers (Articles 1 and 4); joint and
several liability "without prejudice to the provisions of national law concerning the
rights of contribution or recourse" (Article 5); a defective product defined as a product
that "does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circum-
stances into account, including (a) the presentation of the product, (b) the use to which
it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put, and (c) the time when
the product was put into circulation" (Article 6(1)); subsequent improvements not
proving that the product was defective (Article 6(2)); statute of limitations of three
years (Article 10); statute of repose of 10 years (Article 11); producer defenses includ-
ing "compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued by the public au-
thorities" and "the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when [the
producer] put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the
defect to be discovered" ("the state-of-the-art defense") (Article 7(d) and (e)). Individ-
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After nine years of deliberations, the Council of Ministers finally
adopted the Directive on July 25, 1985;19 notification of the Directive
was made six days later." ' The United Kingdom must modify its laws
to conform with the Directive within three years. 92 The United King-
dom does, however, retain the right to choose the manner of implemen-
tation193 and to remove certain defenses.194 These factors led one com-
mentator to conclude that "the Directive, as it stands to be implemented
into [the United Kingdom], does not represent much of an advance on
"3195the present position for consumers ....
Despite uncertainty regarding the extent to which these pressures
will produce significant reform, the current trend is toward favoring the
consumer whenever a "legitimate interpretation of the law" warrants
such a position. 198 The system has moved toward strict liability in
tort.1 97 Even prior to the adoption of the European Economic Commu-
nity Directive, there was speculation that both judges and Parliament
would implement changes to facilitate recovery by those injured by de-
fective products." 8 Such developments would move English law closer
ual Member States are provided the option to eliminate the state-of-the-art defense and
to cap a producer's "total liability for damage ... caused by identical items with the
same defect" at an amount not "less than 70 million ECU, as of the date of adoption"
(Article 15) (as of Feb. 27, 1987, an ECU was worth approximately $1.13 U.S. Wall
St. J., Mar. 2, 1987, at 25. Thus, total liability could be capped at approximately $79.1
million U.S.).
1,0 Id. The imminent adoption of this Directive had long been predicted. See, e.g.,
Dodson, supra note 157, at 62 (1981: "within a relatively short time"); Orban, supra
note 152, at 376 (1978: the forecast effective date of 1980, 18 months after adoption, is
"quite an optimistic forecast and 1981 or 1982 are probably more realistic estimates.").
"1 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 33 n.1 (1985); Sheinman, supra note 188,
at 505.
I'l 28 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 210) 29 (1985) (Article 19); see Product Liabil-
ity, SOLIC. J., Aug. 9, 1985, at 546, col. 1.
1" Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
189, T.I.A.S. No. 4300; 298 U.N.T.S. 79; see Boger, supra note 154, at 2 n.7 ("A
directive is binding upon each member state as to the result to be achieved, but it leaves
to national legislation the choice of form and methods used to implement the
obligation.").
1" Sheinman, supra note 188, at 507. Each country may, for example, individu-
ally decide to eliminate the state-of-the-art defense.
19' Id. at 508. "This [Directive] does nothing to assuage the fear of [consumer
advocates] that a weak, self-defeating Directive would result from nine years of near
impasse. Additionally, the breadth of the possible derogations is barely conducive to the
harmonisation of national laws, the raison d'etre of such legislation." Id.
198 Dodson, supra note 157, at 61.
129 Id. at 62. See Maddox, supra note 162, at 514.
199 The exact manner in which such reforms would be implemented was unclear.
Maddox, supra note 162, at 514 ("Whether Britain will develop its own strict products
liability law or adopt either the Strasbourg Convention or the proposed EEC Directive
is currently a matter of debate."); another possible scenario was expressed by Dodson,
supra note 157, at 63 ("It has even been suggested that some system of compulsory
insurance by producers will be introduced if liability is made strict, whether as a result
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to the general trend occurring in other European countries.199
Notwithstanding these current trends, the United Kingdom is still
described as having the "most unyieldingly traditionalist. . . legal sys-
tem" in Europe.200 One commentator noted that "[d]espite the reforms
in United Kingdom law that have taken place over the last few years, a
manufacturer still has a distinct advantage over an injured party in a
products liability action [both in tort and contract]."'20 1
Thus, the English system establishes rules that are very different
from those in existence in the United States. These two systems would
still differ considerably were strict liability introduced in the United
Kingdom. For example, damage awards would still continue to be
smaller in the United Kingdom because awards would probably still be
determined under the present tort (rather than contract) system, com-
pensation would be emphasized, punitive damages would seldom be
granted, and damages would continue to be awarded by the judge
rather than by a jury.
These differences between U.K. law and both the current system
in the United States and the provisions contained in S. 2760 are sub-
stantial. It is worth analyzing these differences in order to determine
what, if any, aspects of the English system should be incorporated into
the U.S. legal regime.
5. A COMPARISON OF THE PROVISIONS OF S. 2760 WITH THE SYS-
TEM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The mere fact that U.K. law differs from U.S. law regarding the
recoveries available to a claimant injured by a defective product illus-
trates that there are alternatives to the U.S. product liability system.
Various industrialized countries have adopted different product liability
schemes.202 Each of these solutions represents the result of the complex
interplay of that country's own national culture, legal system, and
economy.203
A comparison of the trends occurring in the United States and the
United Kingdom furthers the analysis. Over the past twenty years, vir-
tually every state in the United States has adopted the doctrine of strict
of implementation of the EEC Directive or in advance thereof.").
"" See generally Whincup, supra note 14, at 521-22 ("Most legal systems agree
that compensation for economic loss is not recoverable in tort unless that loss arises out
of and is attached to a claim for personal injury or damage to property.").
200 Id. at 537.
2011 Boger, supra note 154, at 40.
202 See Dodson, supra note 157.
2os Id. at 8.
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liability. 0 4 The areas of contention now center on the propriety of im-
posing liability through the use of the doctrines of market-share liabil-
ity and concert of action, on the appropriateness of capping the size of
awards, and on the usefulness of federal statutory reform that would
supersede state law.205 In the United Kingdom, the trend is toward
imposing liability on manufacturers in a wider scope of cases, and the
battle is centered on whether or not to institute the doctrine of strict
liability.
An analysis of the U.K. and U.S. product liability laws must in-
corporate several aspects of the overall legal/judicial/cultural environ-
ment in the United States that differ from those in the United King-
dom. 0 One author has identified nine "key characteristics of the
American legal-judicial system which increase the size and frequency of
awards. ' 20 7 These characteristics and their English counterparts are:
1. Lawyers' contingency fees are allowed in the United
States whereas they are prohibited in the United Kingdom.
2. Workers' compensation payments in the United
States are low relative to civil damage awards; in the United
Kingdom, there is less of a discrepancy in this regard.
3. The technical expertise of the plaintiff's bar in the
United States is greater than that found in the United
Kingdom.
4. The liberal discovery rules operating in the United
States do not exist in Europe (and only to a limited extent in
the United Kingdom).
5. Public distribution by government and private
sources of safety and accident records critical to developing
cases is prevalent in the United States; such a system does
not exist in the United Kingdom.
6. Juries are utilized in civil lawsuits in the United
States, and this tends to raise the size of awards; in the
United Kingdom, awards are determined by the judge.
7. "Consumer awareness" is high in the United States;
in the United Kingdom, it is lower.
8. American lawyers tend to view product liability liti-
gation as a device for legal and industrial reform; English
attorneys focus on "compensation" for injured claimants as
11" See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
105 See Church, supra note 2, at 25, 26.
" See Orban, supra note 152, at 392; Hollenshead & Conway, supra note 150,
at 52.
107 Orban, supra note 152, at 392, 393.
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the sole purpose of product liability law.
9. Punitive damage awards are available and are regu-
larly awarded in the United States; such awards are rare in
the English system.
These nine characteristics tend to distort direct comparisons be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom. Failure to consider
these critical aspects of the two systems will invariably lead to conclu-
sions that do not capture fully the essence of the problem.
Any comparison must also recognize that the legal rules regarding
product liability in the United Kingdom evolved within its overall envi-
ronment. For example, the absence of strict liability must be viewed in
the context of a country that has implemented national health insur-
ance. Similarly, the smaller awards reflect the absence of contingency
fees for attorneys and the lower per capita income.
This intricate interrelationship among the various aspects of the
system requires that care be exercised in suggesting the introduction of
elements from one country into the legal system of another country.
Similarly, if one country were to adopt the entire legal system of an-
other, such an experiment would, in all probability, prove ineffective
because legal systems do not operate in a vacuum but rather within-the
context of the overall national culture and outlook. Thus, an identical
legal system might operate very differently in two different nations.
Useful insights can, however, be gleaned from such a comparison.
For example, such a comparison reveals that the United States is much
stricter than the United Kingdom in holding manufacturers liable to
claimants injured by defective products.208
Other issues relevant to the provisions contained in the Product
Liability Reform Act that are highlighted by the comparison with the
English system include:
* recovery for pain and suffering are allowed in the
United Kingdom under the tort theory; no limits on such re-
coveries are imposed although award sizes do tend to be con-
siderably smaller than in the United States; 09
* the English system, with its emphasis on compensa-
tion for the injured claimant, does not utilize punitive dam-
ages; and
* the evolution of the English system has been gradual,
even during periods when many organizations and commis-
208 In fact, "[t]he United States has been the world leader in imposing liability on
manufacturers of defective products." Boger, supra note 154, at 2.
209 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text; cf. S. 2760 § 201.
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sions have recommended reforms; for example, the European
Economic Community Directive, which mandates the adop-
tion of a strict liability standard, need only be adopted
within three years and provides the English government with
a variety of alternatives to minimize the impact of this
measure.
This comparison further indicates that the alternative claims pro-
cedure system advocated in this Comment does not have a counterpart
in the United Kingdom. In fact, the only nation that has adopted a
system that incorporates a no-fault scheme in the product liability con-
text is New Zealand. 1 ° No significant conclusions should, however, be
drawn from the fact that no country has adopted such a system. This
uniqueness does not imply that such a system is inherently flawed. The
United States has long been the leader in the field of product liability
and, therefore, currently faces problems that other nations do not. This
voluntary alternative claims system might be the appropriate system for
the United States at this time and a system that will become suitable
for other countries only in the future.
The English system highlights the fact that the American product
liability system is trying to accomplish two objectives: compensate the
injured party and deter manufacturers from producing dangerous prod-
ucts."11 Whereas the English system is primarily concerned with the
issue of compensation, the American system strives to accomplish both
goals simultaneously. The alternative claims system suggested in this
Comment would better segregate the two functions and thus allow each
aspect to be analyzed independently and more objectively, without other
factors distorting the analysis.
The issue of compensation is at the heart of the alternative claims
proposal. By concentrating on reimbursing injured parties in a more
certain and expedited manner, this proposed system would tend to re-
semble the interrelated workings of the English products liability,
workers' compensation, and national health insurance systems. It
should be noted, however, that the English system differs substantially
from the alternative claims system proposed in this Comment."'2 For
10 O'Connell, supra note 139, at 597 n.43 ("In New Zealand, a government
insurance entity pays both unlimited medical expenses and limited wage loss from acci-
dental injuries. Tort liability is concomitantly abolished."); Whincup, supra note 14, at
540 ("all claims for damages for personal injuries . . . have been abolished [and have
been replaced with] a state-run insurance system. . . ."); see also supra note 153.
"I" See also Product Liability Act Amendments, supra note 10, at 83-89 (state-
ment of Prof. Priest). The proposals presented in this comment are designed to segre-
gate the insurance and incentive objectives of tort law.
See supra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
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example, pain and suffering are compensable under tort law in the En-
glish system, whereas they are excluded under the definition of "net
economic loss" that is utilized in the alternative claims system and con-
tained in both S. 1999 rhd S. 2760.
Finally, the English system highlights another important aspect of
the American system: judges in both countries have a great deal of flex-
ibility in working within the system to ensure that justice is done in a
particular case; this flexibility allows judges to implement changes
when the product liability system lags behind changing technological
and economic conditions. This flexibility also permits experimentation
with new systems without the fear that a new system will produce gross
miscarriages of justice. The legal systems in both countries evolve with
changing conditions. Therefore, legislators should consider carefully
any proposed reforms but should not let fear of possible ill conse-
quences totally paralyze the legislative process and thus stifle
innovation.
6. CONCLUSION
The perceived shortcomings of the product liability system in the
United States have sparked calls for reform. One such measure, S.
2760, incorporates both a federal product liability law and an expedited
settlement procedure. This Act fails to achieve the comprehensive re-
forms needed to alleviate the problems inherent in the current system.
Instead, Congress should combine a comprehensive federal product lia-
bility law with an alternative "no-fault" system. Although such an al-
ternative system has not been implemented in any other country, the
potential benefits of such a package are substantial. As one commenta-
tor noted, "federal product liablity reform would exemplify one of fed-
eralism's most fundamental tenets: national problems warrant federal
action."213 The United States has long been a leader in the area of
product liability. The argument that such a system has not yet been
tried by other countries is not a valid reason for rejecting the combina-
tion of federal product liability standards coupled with an alternative
claims system. This package would alleviate many of the ills plaguing
the current product liability system in the United States and would
produce a more rational, efficient, and equitable system.
2 Reed & Watkins, supra note 5, at 472.
[Vol. 9:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss2/5
